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INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE TRIBAL RIGHT
TO CHARTER A MUNICIPALITY
FOR NON-INDIANS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
FOR JURISDICTION ON INDIAN LAND
GERALD T. E. GONZALEZ*
Government is an affair of human loyalties. These loyalties Indian

tribes cannot command if, in the important economic decisions of
their lives, the members of the tribe must look elsewhere for opportunity and guidance. The preservation of tribally owned lands, where
such ownership exists, and the fostering of Indian land-use under
tribal guidance, are essential if the younger generation is to continue
to look to the tribe for aid in life's economic struggles.'
INTRODUCTION

Poverty has become a too-familiar affliction to the American
Indian: contemporary Indians are as haunted by its pervasive maleficence as were their predecessors. 2 This condition and the historical
events which produced or accompanied it have recently begun to
receive widespread attention.3 At the same time, developmental
schemes designed to produce tribal income have begun to appear.
These schemes are the apparent result of tribal searches for new
sources of income, and of federal legislation favoring such
approaches-legislation reflecting congressional dissatisfaction with
the burdens Indian poverty has imposed on the federal budget. 4 The
developmental schemes have commonly attempted to capitalize on
tribal land, one of the few Indian assets. Such schemes have been
generally dependent on long-term lease arrangements because aliena*Member, New Mexico Bar. B.S., New Mexico Highlands University, 1963; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1976.
1. F. Cohen, The Legal Conscience 222, 224 (1960).
2. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 166 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1943); Hearings on H.R. 166 Before the House Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 2, 2A, 3 & 4 (1944); A. Sorkin, American Indians and
Federal Aid (1971).
3. See, e.g., V. Deloria, Custer Died For Your Sins (1969); V. Vogel, This Country Was
Ours (1972); V. Deloria, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties (1974).
4. See M. Price, Law and the American Indian (1973) (hereinafter cited as Price] at 602:
Jobs on the reservation were an important, but not the exclusive, reason for
the impetus toward development. In the 1950's (Section 415 [providing
authority for long-term leases] was passed in 1955), Congress was interested in
ending federal responsibility and federal economic support for reservation life.
It was argued that Indian tribes and individual Indians should make fuller use
of their lands and obtain greater income from them. By leasing the land-often
for non-Indian industrial and residential use, there would be, it was thought,
less dependence on federal largesse.
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tion of Indian land is usually proscribed by federal statutory restrictions.'
Serious problems have surfaced in developmental schemes based
on the leasing of Indian land. Unless resolved, these problems seriously complicate or slow developmental efforts, thereby retarding or
reducing the flow of leasing revenues to Indian lessors. 6 Consider, for
example, the following situations:
Situation 1: An Indian tribe badly in need of income agrees to
lease substantial acreage to a real estate developer. The agreement is
approved by the Department of the Interior in accordance with federal statutory requirements. Under the terms of the agreement the
developer is to create a recreational community on the reservation
and then sublease homes or homesites. The sublessees are principally
retirees, people desiring vacation homes, and commuters willing to
travel from tranquil reservation homesites to hectic urban worksites.
Virtually all will be non-Indians. The tribal Indians have their own
community on another part of the reservation. They are distrustful
of non-Indians and they fear the disintegration of their traditional
way of life under the impact of contemporary non-Indian culture.
Thus they guard against any attempted intrusion of state (nonIndian) jurisdiction onto tribal land or into their lives. The result is
that the tribal government requires the developer to agree that the
recreational community will possess a local government which has
been chartered by the Indian tribe. The State, believing that the
tribal chartering of such a community on the reservation may be the
harbinger of a movement to locate developmental or other business
schemes on reservations as a way of avoiding state regulations and
taxation, sues in federal district court to void the lease agreement.
The State also challenges the power of the tribe to charter a municipality, claiming that such a power has not been conferred by federal
statute and is not an inherent power of Indian sovereignty.
Situation 2: The non-Indian residents of the reservation recreational community want the Indian-chartered community government
to provide the same services they have come to expect from local
governments elsewhere. One of these services is law enforcement.
The tribal government refuses to allow the tribal police to provide
this service because this would tax the already strained tribal budget,
and would pose jurisdictional headaches for tribal police and gov5. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. &§ 391 through 416 (1970).
6. E.g., the Pueblo of Tesuque, an Indian tribe, entered into a developmental scheme
involving the lease referred to in text at note 9, infra, and subject to the litigation described
in text at notes 30 through 34, infra. Since that litigation, development has been at a
standstill and now appears unlikely to resume.
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ernment. The tribe also refuses to allow state law enforcement
authorities to furnish police services on the reservation because this
would enlarge the area of state governmental (non-Indian) intrusion
into reservation life, and might invite such intrusion in other areas.
Thus the community government sets up its own police force, hiring
non-Indian police officers from outside the reservation. Shortly afterwards, recreational community residents make a strong protest to the
community government about frequent late night drag-racing on the
community's streets. The community government then passes an
ordinance prescribing traffic rules, speed limits and traffic signs. On
patrol one night after the traffic signs have been erected, a community police officer observes three cars race with each other through a
stop sign. The officer gives chase, stopping all three cars. One driver
is a reservation Indian. Another is a non-Indian resident of the recreational community. The third is a non-Indian who resides off the
reservation. All three drivers protest that the officer has no right or
authority to stop them, issue a citation, or arrest them.
Situation 3: The recreational community's government council
originally consists of members selected by the developer from among
its non-Indian employees. As the community population grows,
council members selected by the developer are gradually replaced by
elected community residents until all council members are residents.
The tribal council discovers that one of the developmental community residents is a member of a satanic religious sect. Witchcraft is
greatly feared by tribal members because of tribal religious beliefs;
tribal customary law forbids practicing withcraft. The tribal council
urges the community council to pass an ordinance forbidding the
practice of witchcraft within the territorial confines of the leasehold
community. The community council refuses, claiming that this
would be an interference with "freedom of religion." The tribal
council then notifies the community council that if the ordinance is
not passed, the charter of the community's local government will be
suspended or revoked. The community council is contemplating
filing an action against the tribal council to enjoin a suspension or
revocation of its charter. The member of the satanic sect also contemplates action against the community council-and perhaps the
tribal council, as well-to enjoin charter suspension and revocation
and enforcement of the contested ordinance.
As may be surmised from the preceding situations, a primary
source of difficulty in developmental schemes based on creating nonIndian leasehold communities has been jurisdictional conflicts and
uncertainties. Particularly heated contests have involved state governments on one side and tribal lessors or developer lessees on the
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other.7 Where the latter cannot claim the tribe possesses jurisdictional supremacy through a federal grant of power by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, such supremacy may be claimed under the doctrine of Indian sovereignty. With respect to claims made under the
rubric of Indian sovereignty, tribes and developers alike have taken
the position that powers of Indian sovereignty supersede state governmental powers not only with respect to affairs which involve only
Indian interests, but also with respect to leasehold interests and
associated activities involving non-Indian lessees. Adherence to this
position by the Indian tribes and developers has led to at least one
instance of a tribal government issuing a charter to a municipal gov-

ernment designed to provide for the needs of a non-Indian developmental community being created on a long-term leasehold in tribal
land.' At least one other lease prescribes such a government once
development is successfully progressing. 9
A growing number of cases has involved the convoluted jurisdictional and sovereignty issues just described. The manner in which
Indian lands subject to developmental leases may be gradually
wrested from Indian control is nowhere more aptly illustrated than
in California. California is somewhat unique among the southwestern
states in that it assumed broad civil and criminal jurisdiction over
Indian affairs pursuant to Public Law 280.1 0 The provisions of this
law were amended to require Indian consent as a precondition to
assumption of such jurisdiction before any of the other southwestern
states assumed jurisdiction under its provisions.' ' The major statutory limitation on California's jurisdiction is that state laws cannot
be applied to Indian trust lands where those laws constitute encumbrances on the lands.
What is important with respect to the California cases is the
7. See, e.g., Note, Need for a FederalPolicy in Indian Economic Development, 2 N.M.L.
Rev. 71 (1972); Comment, Indians-State Jurisdiction over Real Estate Developments on
Tribal Lands, 2 N.M.L. Rev. 81 (1972) [hereinafter cited as New Mexico Comment];
Chambers & Price, Regulating Sovereignty: SecretarialDiscretion and the Leasing of Indian
Lands, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1061, 1088-94 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Chambers & Price].
8. Amendment to lease between Pueblo de Cochiti and Great Western Cities, Inc.
(August 18, 1970), approved by Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Harrison Loesch (April
25, 1970).
9. Lease between Pueblo of Tesuque and Sangre de Cristo Development Company, Inc.
(April 17, 1970), approved by Walter 0. Olson, Albuquerque Area Director, Bureau of
Indian Affairs (May 24, 1970) pursuant to delegation of approval authority from Commissioner of Indian Affairs (May 20, 1970).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1964, 1970),as amended by Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1970), as amended by Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284.
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process by which the state's exercises of jurisdiction have gradually
swallowed whole any Indian control over their lands. An early case in
this process was Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of
Riverside' 2 which was an action to enjoin the assessment and collection of a possessory interest tax which had been levied by Riverside
County, California, on the developer-lessees of the Agua Caliente
Indians. The Indians argued that the tax was a levy on the land and
thus a statutorily prohibited encumbrance-the tax added a financial
burden which made it impossible for the developer-lessee to pay the
agreed rental, thereby decreasing the value of the land. The Ninth
Circuit held that no congressional purpose forbade this type of tax
which was not a levy on the land itself, but on the cash value of the
lessee's interest.
A contemporaneous California state court case was People v.
Rhoades." In Rhoades an Indian living on trust lands had been
convicted of violating a state statute requiring anyone owning a
building on forested land to maintain a firebreak around the building. The defendant appealed, contending that the statute constituted
an encumbrance. The California Court of Appeals found that the
statute was not an encumbrance because there was no basis for concluding that the firebreak requirement would depreciate the value of
the property.' 4
In Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego' s the
Indian tribe sought declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of a county gambling ordinance on reservation land after the
tribe adopted its own ordinance authorizing the establishment on the
reservation of a card room where games not proscribed by a state
gambling statute would be played. The federal district court held
that the county ordinance was not a zoning ordinance and was not
an encumbrance. "Encumbrance," said the court, was a burden on
the land imposed by third persons which might impair alienability of
the fee, e.g., mortgages, liens or easements. Two contemporaneous
12. 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972),aff'g 306 F. Supp.
279 (N.M.C.D. Cal. 1969).
13. 12 Cal. App.3d 720, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
14. The court carefully distinguished Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70
Wash.2d 668, 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967). The Snohomish court had
defined "encumbrance" to mean any burden on land depreciative of its value such as a lien,
easement or servitude, which, while adverse to the landowner's interest, does not conflict
with his conveyance of the land in fee. The Rhoades court found this definition of encumbrance too narrow to cover the restrictions of the statute at issue there.
15. 324 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1974).
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non-zoning cases taking similar views were Ricci v. County of Riverside1 I and Madrigal v. County of Riverside. 1 7

The question of whether zoning laws, themselves, constitute
encumbrances was confronted thereafter in Agua Caliente Band of
Mission Indians' Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs.' " This was
an action by the tribe seeking a declaration that the zoning laws of
the City of Palm Springs did not apply to Indian lands located within
the city limits. The district court held that: the Indian lands were
legally included within the city upon the city's incorporation under
California law in 1938; 1 application of the zoning ordinance did
not constitute an unlawful interference with tribal sovereignty or
encumber Indian land;2" and Public Law 280 did not deny due
process of law by producing different treatment of Indian lands in
different states, or violate the constitutional provision giving Congress the power to regulate commerce with the Indians by delegating
a non-delegable power.
The obvious result of this line of California cases 2' has been the
loss of Indian control over Indian land. As one authority commented
regarding Riverside County (where the City of Palm Springs and the
Agua Caliente tribe are located), a county which has generated a
disproportionate share of the California litigation: "The exhaustive
integration of the reservations into Riverside County is tantamount
to an annexation of one government by another."' 22
16. Civil No. 70-1134-EC (C.D. Cal. 1971) (upholding county power to impose its building code on allotted Indian land).
17. Civil No. 70-1893-EC (C.D. Cal. 1971) (upholding application to Cahuilla Reservation of county rock festival ordinance).
18. 347 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1972), vacated and remanded (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 1975) (by
unpublished order).
19. But see Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espafiola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 915 (1961) (village could not extend boundaries to include
leased Indian land or impose sales tax on sales and services on leased land).
20. But see Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash.2d 668, 425 P.2d 22
(1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967) (county zoning ordinance was encumbrance on
Indian land prohibited by federal statute).
21. Other related cases include: Palm Springs Spa, Inc. v. Riverside County, 18 Cal.
App.3d 372, 95 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1971) (taxpayer action against county to recover taxes paid
under protest on leasehold in lands held in trust by federal government for Indians);
Guardianship of Prieto v. City of Palm Springs, 328 F. Supp. 716 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (action
by Indian alloted land geographically within city boundaries for damages for interference
with reasonable expectancy of leasing stemming from city's restrictive zoning); Sessions,
Inc. v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 694 (C.D. Cal. 1972), affl'd, 491 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Secretary of the Interior in representing United States as trustee for Indian lands, could
terminate lease with Indians).
For discussion of California cases in the leasing context, see Chambers & Price, supra note
7, at 1089-96.
22. Price, supra note 4, at 283.
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It may have been with an eye toward the early California cases 2 3
and a desire to avoid the litigation and loss of control over Indian
land which they seemed to portend that the developmental leases
negotiated by two New Mexico tribes-the Pueblo de Cochiti2 4 and
the Pueblo of Tesuque 2' -required that the non-Indian developmental communities possess municipal governments chartered by the
tribe. Nevertheless, the New Mexico leases have generated substantial
litigation. The first such suit, New Mexico v. Russell,2 6 was an action
filed by the Attorney General of New Mexico against officials of the
Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs seeking a
declaratory judgment that they acted without proper authority in
approving an amended lease which required the chartering of a developmental municipality government by the Pueblo de Cochiti's tribal
government. The suit, which maintained that the actions of the federal officials were void and that the State had exclusive authority to
create a municipality within its boundaries, was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the developer, the
"municipality," and the State of New Mexico. 2 7 The stipulation
purported to recognize state jurisdiction over various activities of the
developer and the municipality (including construction, civil and
criminal disputes involving non-Indians, and taxation of the developer-lessee's interest in the leasehold), and also contained an agreement by the developer to purchase its water from non-Indian
sources.2 8 Neither the tribe nor the federal agencies were a party to
the stipulation.2 9
Sangre de Cristo Development Corp. v. City of Santa Fe30 was an
action instituted by a developer-lessee to enjoin a city and a board of
county commissioners from exercising subdivision, platting and planning authority pursuant to state statute over a developmental leasehold located in land of the Pueblo of Tesuque, an Indian tribe. The
23. The original lessee in the lease with the Pueblo of Cochiti was, significantly, a
California corporation. Lease between Pueblo de Cochiti and California Cities, April 15,
1969, approved by Melvin Nelander, Acting Albuquerque Area Director, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, April 12, 1969, pursuant to delegation of approval authority from Secretary of
Interior dated April 7, 1969.
24. Note 8, supra.
25. Note 9, supra.
26. Civil No. 8745 (Dist. Ct. N.M., filed Dec. 4, 1970) (dismissed Jun. 4, 1971).
27. Stipulation of Great Western Cities, Inc. and Town of Cochiti Lake, New Mexico v.
Russell, Civil No. 8745 (Dist. Ct. N.M., filed Dec. 4, 1970). For discussion of the legal
effects of this stipulation, see New Mexico Comment, supra note 7.
28. New Mexico Comment, supra note 7, at 82.
29. Id.
30. 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323 (1972),cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
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New Mexico Supreme Court held that the United States had preempted control of subdivision, planning and platting of leased Indian
land, thus foreclosing any exercise of state jurisdiction. The Attorney
General of New Mexico responded by filing another action in federal
3
district court, Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Development Co., 1 in
which it joined various Department of the Interior and Bureau of
Indian Affairs officials with the developer lessee as defendants. The
State's action contended that by approving the lease and development plans the federal officials had acted beyond their lawful authority and that the developer-lessee had failed to comply with applicable
state statutes. The district court found that there was no federal
preemption to the extent that state action did not touch the tribe or
its members, and then held that the state statutes applied to the
3
developer-lessee's activities. The Tenth Circuit reversed, 2 holding
that the case was not a case or controversy for purposes of federal
jurisdiction, and that the declaratory judgment sought by the plaintiffs was not a proper remedy.
The Tenth Circuit's case or controversy holding was based in part
on the contention that the lease had not been approved in compliance with National Environmental Protection Act requirements
which had been held to apply to the contested lease in a connected
case, Davis v. Morton." 3 The Tenth Circuit found that it was speculative when, or even whether, the National Environmental Protection
Act requirements would be met inasmuch as developmental activities
were at a virtual standstill. The holding that declaratory judgment
was an improper remedy relied on the contention that the ongoing
activity-or lack of activity-in the matters being litigated, i.e., the
uncertainty concerning compliance with the National Environmental
3
Protection Act, might radically alter the fact pattern in the future. "
Both developers and Indian tribes appear to favor Indian-chartered
community governments for a number of reasons other than mere
ideological espousal of the doctrine of Indian sovereignty. These
reasons include: (1) the need to satisfy the desires of non-Indian
31. 372 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.M. 1974).
32. 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975).
33. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
34. The New Mexico cases have presumably been of concern to the Navajo tribe, which
has expressed interest in developing a community on its reservation in conjunction with
certain proposed coal gasification complexes which would probably employ a large number
of non-Indian personnel. State concern over the Navajo interest appears to have led to a
meeting between New Mexico State Planning Office personnel, representatives of the Navajo
tribe, and other state and private parties in interest on Jun. 6, 1975 at which jurisdictional
questions and related issues were on the agenda. Letter from Eve Taggart, Field Coordinator
for the New Mexico intergovernmental Services Division to Graciela Olivarez, New Mexico
State Planning Officer, Jun. 4, 1975.
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lessees and sublessees to have an organ of local government responsive to their needs and sensitive to local problems or conditions, and
yet do so without compromising Indian sovereignty and authority on
tribal land;3" (2) a desire to minimize what Indians perceive to be
culturally corrosive contact with non-Indian culture by providing a
non-Indian instrument of local government to which the non-Indians
can turn with complaints or suggestions concerning their community;
(3) the need for a governmental institution which will be available to
provide community services the non-Indians expect or contracted for
under their leases after the developer is no longer available for such
purposes; (4) and the desire for a local government which does not
have to respond to state developmental policies or assertions of
authority, but which instead is responsive to those policies and guidelines set by the Indian tribe, and which, while adhering to tribal
policies and guidelines, will provide a structured
forum for tribe/
36
developer/non-Indian community interaction.
35. See Chambers & Price, supra note 7, at 1089:
State jurisdiction seems threatening to Indian autonomy and culture
because it reduces the probability that a relatively impoverished culture can
retain its land base. State taxation, like zoning, is an obvious illustration;, state
property taxes would result in tax liens and foreclosure sales if the constraints
of a cash economy were imposed on the reservation. The same effect can be
seen with respect to state building codes or zoning ordinances; compliance
with these provisions becomes costly for an Indian community. State jurisdiction may make development leases less attractive, thus reducing revenue to the
tribe. The state, for example, might legislature to restrain Indian preference
clauses or to prohibit developments that conflict with a state land use plan.
(Footnote omitted.)
36. In New Mexico, at least, an additional reason for disfavoring state-chartered municipalities is the possibility of a bar to incorporation because of the leasehold municipality's
inability to comply with all the statutory procedures surrounding state municipal corporations. The difficulty stems not from incorporation procedures, but from statutory procedures for disincorporation. At the expiration of a tribal residential development lease
there would be a de facto disincorporation (not provided for by statute), and improvements
on the leasehold would follow the land in reverting to the tribe. Under present federal case
law, such Indian property is exempt from state taxation. Thus, after lease expiration there
will be little, if any, taxable property remaining on the former leasehold. Yet N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 14-4-9 (1953) specifies:
If insufficient money is received from the operation of the property of the
disincoroporated municipality to pay [municipal] obligations ... the board of
county commissioners [of the county where the municipality was located]
shall levy a tax on all taxable property within the boundary of the municipality at the time of its disincorporation. This tax shall be sufficient to pay
the obligations incurred in the operation of the property of the municipality
and to comply with the terms and conditions of the evidences of the bonded
indebtedness....
The probable result under the statute would be the inability of creditors of the municipality
to collect. This potential difficulty could complicate the municipality's problems with
borrowing transactions. Other states' statutory schemes apparently present similar incorporation problems. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over
ReservationIndians, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 535, 581 (1975).
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Considering the weight which developers and Indian tribes have
attached to these reasons-as evidenced by the number of cases
which have been generated-it is important that the validity of such
municipalities be placed on a sound legal footing. It is also important
that a means of analyzing the murky jurisdictional issues be provided. This paper will attempt to do this. In the course of this
attempt, an effort will be made to bring a fresh perspective to the
doctrine of Indian sovereignty. Nevertheless, that doctrine remains
firmly rooted in the jurisprudential work of Chief Justice Marshall
and Felix S. Cohen. Felix Cohen's work still remains a constant in
the shifting sands of Indian law and federal Indian policy, marking
the distance come since Chief Justice Marshall first trod this difficult
ground. Yet the social and political situation in this country has
undergone dramatic change since Felix Cohen's study of Indian law,
first came to print in 194 1. 3 7 New legal tools with the capacity for
more refined and discerning analysis are now needed to supplement
or supplant the old. By attempting to introduce a new analytical tool
into Indian law, this paper strives to enable our jurisprudential system to keep pace with these changes.
THE DOCTRINE OF INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY EXAMINED
The Existence and Nature of Indian Sovereignty
There is no federal statute which expressly grants Indian tribes the
power to create a municipality, although there is statutory provision
for tribes to become corporate business entities chartered by the
federal government in certain circumstances. 3 8 The search for such a
power calls for a close examination of another major source of tribal
powers-Indian sovereignty.
A. Foundations of the Doctrine of Indian Sovereignty
Discussion of Indian sovereignty must continue to return to the
judicial wellspring from which it began to flow, Worcester v. Geor37. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]. It
is the reprint edition of Cohen's work which is cited in this paper.
This has been the pattern of change in our system of laws. If any man of the preceding
jurisprudential generation could have seen and understood this, it would have been Felix
Cohen. See, e.g., F. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals 35 (1933):
[E] lementary logic teaches us that every legal decision and every finite set of
decisions can be subsumed under an infinite number of different general rules,
just as an infinite number of different curves may be traced through any point
or finite collection of points. Every decision is a choice between different rules
which logically fitt all past decisions but logically dictate conflicting results in
the instant case.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1970) (tribes organized under constitutions and bylaws adopted
under 25 U.S.C. § 476 may become federally-chartered business corporations).
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gia. 3 9 There, analyzing the relationship between Indian tribes . and
the federal government, and the interference of Georgia statutes with
that relationship, the Supreme Court stated:
The Indian nations have always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power,
which excluded them from intercourse with any other European
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed ... .40 (Emphasis supplied.)
Continuing its analysis, the Supreme Court then said:
[T] he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power
does not surrender its independence-its right to a self-governmentby associating with a stronger and taking its protection. A weak
state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the
protections of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the
right of government, and ceasing to be a state. . . . "Tributary and
Feudatory states," says Vattel, "do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self-government, and sovereign and independent authority, are left in the administration of the
state." 4 1
The Supreme Court's language in Worcester clearly indicates that
whatever the sovereign powers of an Indian tribe may be, they derive
from the inherent, original powers of the tribe as a distinct, independent, self-governing entity, not from some federal constitutional,
statutory, or other delegation of power. 4 2 As to which of those
inherent powers the tribes may still exercise, post-Worcester decisions4 sustain the view expressed by Felix Cohen that:
39. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In Worcester, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of a white missionary living (with the approval of the Cherokee nation and
permission of the President of the United States) on Cherokee land for doing so without a
license from the State of Georgia and without having taken an oath to support and defend
Georgia's laws and constitution.
40. Id. at 559.
41. Id. at 560-61.
42. Cohen, supra note 37, at 122 states:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of
decisions... is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of
Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never
been extinguished.
43. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (no federal court jurisdiction to
try Indian for murder of another Indian); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1889) (tribe had
authority to adjudicate Indian inheritance); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 385 (1904) (tribe
had authority to tax non-Indian lessees of tribal lands); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S.
602 (1916) (tribe had authority to regulate domestic relations of its members); Williams v.
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Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the
United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with
foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty
of the tribe, i.e., its powers of self-government .... 44 (Footnote

omitted.)

B. Judicial-Congressional Shaping of the Doctrine of
Indian Sovereignty
The present status of Indian sovereign powers is not solely a product of federal adjudication. It is largely the product of the interplay
between federal judicial and legislative forces.4 s State legislatures
have played a lesser role as is discussed infra.* 6
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, Congress was
more concerned about Indian removal to the West 4 I than with Indian political status: as long as the option of westward removal remained open there was little incentive to grapple with complex
questions revolving around relationships with Indians living in close
proximity to non-Indians. In 1853, however, the Gadsden Purchase 4 8 fixed the final boundaries of the continental United States.
Contemporaneously, there was a change in the emphasis of congres49
Containment
sional Indian policy from removal to containment.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (no state court jurisdiction to hear suit by non-Indian for unpaid
balance of Indian customer); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962) (state
could regulate off-reservation, but not on-reservation fishing by Indians); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (state may tax off-reservation tribal enterprise if tribal
self-government not involved).
44. Cohen, supra note 37, at 123. And see text accompanying note 126-131 infra.
45. See Comment, Indian Law: The Application of the One-man, One-vote Standard of
Baker v. Carr to Tribal Elections, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 668 at 670 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Minnesota Comment] and Comment, The Indian Battlefor Self-Determination, 58 Calif. L.
Rev. 445 at 463-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as California Comment].
46. See text accompanying notes 137-170 infra.
47. See, e.g., Treaty of July 8, 1817 with the Cherokees, 4 Stat. 156, in which part of
the Cherokee nation, pressured by white encroachment on their traditional way of life,
petitioned the federal government for vacant land across the Mississippi River; Treaty of
Oct. 3, 1818 with the Delaware nation, 4 Stat. 188, marking the first treaty requiring an
Indian tribe to remove west of the Mississippi River at the behest of the federal government;
and Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, § 1, 4 Stat. 411, which specified at 411-12:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America, in Congress assembled, That it shall and may be lawful for
the President of the United States to cause so much of any territory belonging
to the United States, west of the river Mississippi, not included in any state or
organized territory, and to which the Indian title has been extinguished, as he
may judge necessary, to be divided into a suitable number of districts, for the
reception of such tribes or nation of Indians as may choose to exchange the
lands where they now reside, and remove there; ...
48. Gadsden Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031.
49. Containment, a policy which sought to tie Indian groups to restricted geographic
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reflected an acceptance of a permanent Indian presence within the
borders of American society. It also spurred congressional concern
with Indian political status, leading to legislation which abolished the
presidential power to treat with the Indians, declaring:
No Indian Nation or Tribe within the territory of the United
States, shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
Nation, Tribe or power with whom the United States may contract
by treaty .... so
The federal courts responded by upholding the sovereignty doctrine in Ex parte Crow Dog." 1 Required to determine whether the
killing of one Indian by another in Indian country was an offense

under a federal statute providing the death penalty for murders committed in any place under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court held there was no exclusive federal jurisdiction in Indian

country within the meaning of the statute, notwithstanding the legislation restricting recognition of Indian sovereignty and abolishing the
presidential Indian treaty-making power.5 2 The Court was not saying, however, that the tribes were free of federal control. Its opinion
also recognized as valid and not infringing Indian sovereignty a conlocations designated as reservations, was expressed in various congressional enactments. See,
e.g., Act of July 20, 1867, ch. 32, § 2, 15 Stat. 17:
And be it further enacted, That said commissioners [of the commission to
treat with hostile Indians] are required to examine and select a district or
districts of country having suitficient area to receive all the Indian tribes now
occupying territory east of the Rocky Mountains, not now peacefully residing
on permanent reservations under treaty stipulations,...
and Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 132, § 4, 18 Stat. 420:
That hereafter, for the purpose of properly distributing the supplies appropriated for the Indian service, it is hereby made the duty of each agent in
charge of Indians and having supplies to distribute ... to give out supplies to
the heads of families, and not to the heads of tribes or bands, and not to give
out supplies for a greater length of time than one week in advance.
The purpose of the latter enactment was to tie nomadic tribes more closely to Indian agent
stations located on the reservations by preventing them from going more than a half week's
travel time away from the station if they wanted their next ration of supplies.
50. 25 U.S.C. § 7 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat.
544). Every Indian treaty is a substantive affirmation of Indian sovereignty as it recognizes a
sovereign power, the power to treat. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559
(1832):
The constitution, by declaring treaties aleady made, as well as those to be
made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the
previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank
among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty"
and "nation," are words... having each a definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other
nations of the earth; they are applied to all in the same sense.

51. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
52. Id. at 565-568. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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gressional-made 1877 agreement with the Sioux tribe" 3 in which
Congress pledged to secure to them an orderly government and subject them to the laws of the United States. The Court then went on
to hold that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to bring the
indictment against the prisoner, that the conviction and sentence
were void, and that the imprisonment was illegal. 5 4
The Supreme Court's position in Crow Dog was clarified the following year in Elk v. Wilkins. "s In Wilkins the Court held that the
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment' 6 did not apply so as
to make an Indian born on a Nebraska reservation a Nebraska citizen.
The Court relied on sovereignty doctrine in reaching its holding:
The Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United
States, were not, strictly speaking, foreign States; but they were

alien nations, distinct political communities, with whom the United
States might and habitually did deal, as they thought fit, either
through treaties made by the President and Senate,
or through act of
5 7
Congress in the ordinary forms of legislation.
With respect to the legislation abolishing the President's power to
make treaties with Indians, the Court found that this action was
merely a consequence of separation of powers:
The provision of the act of Congress of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, that
"hereafter no Indian nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent ... power with whom the United
States may contract by treaty," is coupled with a provision that the
obligation of any treaty already lawfully made is not thereby invalidated or impaired; and its utmost possible effect is to require the
Indian tribes to be dealt with for the future through the legislative
and not through the treaty-making power.5 8
Reading Wilkins and Crow Dog together, the doctrinal position
which emerges is that, while Indian tribes might be subject to some
constitutional and legislative provisions, such provisions must be
53. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254. The agreement was enacted by statute
rather than ratified as a treaty because of the proviso in the Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16
Stat. 544 which purported to abolish the presidential power to treat with the Indians. The
4th and part of the 6th article of the agreement were not ratified since they were not agreed
to by the Indians. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1883).
54. Id. at 572.
55. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
56. That sentence reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. 112 U.S. 94 at 99.
58. Id. at 107.
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carefully examined for applicability, not applied automatically
merely because they apply to the states, state citizens or the United
States. As the Supreme Court said in Crow Dog in discussing the
congressional agreement with the Sioux,
it was no part of the design [of this agreement] to treat the individuals as separately responsible and amenable, in all their personal
and domestic relations with each other, to the general laws of the
United States, outside of those which were enacted expressly with
reference to them as members of an Indian tribe. 5 9
The decisions in Wilkins and Crow Dog were rendered when public
and congressional sentiments were turning from concern with Indian
containment to assimilation. Thus, congressional response to these
decisions was not long in coming. In 1885 Congress passed the Major
Crimes Act providing that
all Indians, committing against ... another Indian or other person
any of the following crimes, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape,
assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny within any
Territory of the United States, and either within or without an
Indian reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of such
Territory relating to said crimes, and shall be subject to the same
penalties as are all other persons charged with the commission of
said crimes, respectively; ... and all such Indians committing any of
the above crimes ... within the limits of any Indian reservation,
shall be subject to the same laws, tried in the same courts and in the
same manner ... as are all other persons committing any of the
above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.6 0
The validity of this act was confirmed in the same year by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama,6 ' a case involving the
indictment of two California Indians for the murder of another
Indian on the same reservation. After Kagama was decided, sentiment for Indian assimilation continued to rise and finally culminated
in the General Allotment Act of 188762 which prescribed the allot59. 109 U.S. 556 at 570.
60. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1970). The present version of the act includes the crimes of incest, assault with a dangerous
weapon, and robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
61. 118 U.S. 375 (1885). The case arose on a demurrer to the indictment. It reached the
Supreme Court by certificate of division of opinion between the judges of the circuit court
of the United States for the district of California.
62. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 25

U.S.C.).
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ment of Indian lands in severalty as a desirable means of "civilizing"

the Indians. 6 3
After passage of the General Allotment Act, the Supreme Court
adhered to its policy of defending Indian sovereignty 6 4 while popular pressure for assimilation continued and congressional legislation
slowly nibbled at what the Court was attempting to preserve. 6 By

1934, however, it had become starkly apparent that the congressional assimilative policies were drawing the Indian tribes ever more
deeply into a socioeconomic quagmire. 6 6 The result of this realization was enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.67

That act prohibited any further allotment of Indian lands, returned
to tribal ownership lands withdrawn from homestead entry but not
claimed, allowed tribes to form or formalize tribal governments, and
permitted them to incorporate for business purposes. 6 ' For a time,
it seemed, both Congress and the federal courts were espousing policies which were at least nominally designed to protect Indian cul-

tural, economic and governmental integrity.
By 1953, however, the pendulum of congressional policy had
begun to swing back toward assimilation and termination of reserva-

tion status again came into favor. These ideas first received formal
congressional endorsement in House Concurrent Resolution 108,69
63. For a detailed history of the events leading up to enactment of the General Allotment Act, its administration after passage, and the results it produced up to 1900, see Otis,
The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands (Prucha ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Otis].
64. For example, in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896), the Supreme Court
concluded the fifth amendment of the Constitution did not apply to invalidate Cherokee
legislation prescribing criminal grand juries of five persons:
The case in this regard ... depends upon whether the powers of local government exercised by the Cherokee nation are Federal powers created by and
springing from the Constitution of the United States, and hence controlled by
the Fifth Amendment. .. , or whether they are local powers not created by
the Constitution, although subject to its general provisions and the paramount
authority of Congress. The repeated adjudications of this court have long
answered the former question in the negative.
65. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795 (partly codified in 25
U.S.C. § 397 (1970)), introducing a system of leasing Indian allotted lands which led to
abuses such as exploitation of Indian lessors by Indian and non-Indian lessees. These abuses
are discussed in Otis, supra note 63 at 98-123.
66. Total Indian landholdings were reduced from 136,397,985 acres in 1887 to
48,000,000 acres by 1934. Hearingson S. 2755 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), at 16.
67. Act of Jun. 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 17, 48 Stat. 988 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § § 461-79
(1970)).
68. Id. The act, while providing sorely needed changes, may nevertheless be criticized for
certain inadequacies. See text accompanying notes 111-127 infra for more detailed discussion.
69. H. Con. Res. 108, Aug. 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B132, stating in part:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the
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and were subsequently embodied in Public Law 280, 0 also passed in
1953, which allowed five states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian tribes within their borders, and permitted other
states to acquire similar jurisdiction upon compliance with certain
procedures.'7 ' The following year, Congress enacted legislation which
withdrew all federal services and Bureau of Indian Affairs support
from certain reservations in order to induce those Indians to enter
the mainstream of American society. 2 And in 1955, Indian lands
were opened to long-term leasing for a wide number of purposes in
accordance with permissive new legislation," thus exposing reservations more broadly to non-Indian influences.
In this changed policy climate the federal courts initially signaled
their continuing affirmation of Indian sovereignty. 74 However, the
1959 Supreme Court opinion in Williams v. Lee 71 may have provided a foreboding glimpse of the changes an altered political climate
might work in Indian sovereignty doctrine. There, the Court held
that a state court did not have jurisdiction over a dispute between a
Indians ... subject to the same laws and ... privileges and responsibilities
as ... other citizens of the United States ... and
Whereas the Indians ... should assume their full responsibilities as American
citizens: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it
is declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of
the Indian tribes ... located within the States of California, Florida, New
York, and Texas, and all of the following named Indian tribes... should be
freed from Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians: [the Flathead, Klamath, Menominee and
Potowatamie tribes, and the Chippewa tribe on Turtle Mountain Reservation].
70. 18 U.S.C. § § 1151, 1162, and 28 U.S.C. § § 1331, 1360 (1970)as amended by Act
of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.
71. Id. Later amendment of Public Law 280 resulted in requiring tribal consent before
states could acquire the jurisdiction permitted by the act. 25 U.S.C. § § 1321-1322 (1970).
72. See Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250, 25 U.S.C. § § 891-901 (1970)
(Menominee termination); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718, 25 U.S.C. § 564
(1970) (Klamath termination); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768, 25 U.S.C.
§ 721 (1970) (termination of Texas tribes); Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1207, 68 Stat. 1099,
25 U.S.C. § § 741-60 (1970) (Paiute termination).
73. Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970)).
74. See, e.g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956) where, in
holding the Oglala Sioux Tribe had the power to impose a grazing tax on non-Indian lessees
of reservation land and to possess tribal courts with jurisdiction over the crime of adultery
by tribal members, the Eighth Circuit stated:
As late as 1940 the Supreme Court, in the case of United States Fidelity &
Guarantee Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S. Ct. 653, 84 L. Ed. 894, recognized the
quasi sovereignty of Indian nations in holding that they possessed the sovereign exemption from suits and cross-complaints excepting where authorized.
...We accordingly are of the opinion that the plaintiffs cannot prevail....
We hold that Indian tribes, such as the defendant Oglala Sioux Tribe. . . still
(Quotation omitted.)
possess their inherent sovereignty ....
75. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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non-Indian trading post owner-creditor, and debtor Indians. But the
Court reformulated the rule by which states could extend their
authority onto the reservation, allowing the extension provided it did
not interfere with the right of Indians to make and abide by their
own laws on the reservation. 6 Two subsequent cases decided in
1962 and 1965 respectively, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan7
and Warren Trading Post v. Tax Commission,7 8 generally affirmed
the doctrinal stance of Williams. "9

In 1968 Congress contributed significantly to the erosion of Indian sovereignty by legislating the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.80
That act has the effect of attempting to impose certain constitutional
contraints on tribal government. 8 ' Two cases litigated in the
Supreme Court since passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission8 2 and Mescalero Indian Tribe
v. Jones,8" added to concerns over recent shifts in federal attitudes
toward Indian sovereignty. McClanahan, which concluded that state
personal income taxes cannot be imposed on reservation Indian income derived wholly from reservation sources, raised particular concern that it was tolling the impending death of Indian sovereignty. In
McClanahan the Supreme Court relied on the 1868 federal treaty
with the Navajos, the Arizona Enabling Act, and other federal statutes
in disposing of the tax liability issue,8 indicating that the sovereignty doctrine, while still relevant, provided a "backdrop against
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read." '8
A unified reading of four post-McClanahan Supreme Court cases,
United States v. Mazurie,8 6 Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth
Judicial District,8 7 Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes,8 8 and Bryan v. Itasca County,8 9 has helped place McClana76. Id. at 220.
77. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
78. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
79. See text accompanying notes 142-154 infra for a more detailed analysis of these
cases.
80. 25 U.S.C. § § 1301-41 (1970).
81. See text accompanying notes 111-126 infra for further discussion of this act. See also
Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 617 (1968) for
an early expression of reservations over the act's potential effects.
82. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
83. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
84. 411 U.S. 164, 173-81. See discussion in text accompanying notes 155-163 infra.
85. 411 U.S. 164 at 172.
86. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
87. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
88. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
89. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).

Summer 1977]

JURISDICTION ON INDIAN LAND

han in perspective, assuaging concerns for the vigor of Indian sovereignty doctrine. Upholding tribal power to enact legislation forbidding sales of liquor on reservation land without a tribal liquor license,
the Mazurie court indicated Indian sovereignty was still a trenchant
doctrinal force. 9" Fisher, an adoption dispute between reservation

Indians where one party petitioned for adoption in a state district
court and the other opposed the state proceeding on the grounds of
exclusive tribal court jurisdiction, resulted in a holding that the tribal
court possessed exclusive jurisdiction since a contrary result would
infringe tribal sovereignty. 9 1 Moe was a tribal attack on imposition
of a state vendor's license fee and precollected sales tax on tribal
members selling cigarettes on their reservation. Referring to McClanahan's "backdrop" of sovereignty statement, the Moe court held the
General Allotment Act did not permit imposition of the license fee
or the sales tax as applied to sales to Indians, but the state could
require Indian vendors to add sales tax to any sales made to nonIndians.9 2 In Bryan a tribal member residing on trust land sought a
declaratory injunction to prevent the county and state from levying a
personal property tax on the Indian's mobile home. Footnoting a
reference to McClanahan's"backdrop" of Indian sovereignty as additional support for its decision, 9 the Bryan court declared the tax
invalid, there being no congressional grant of power to the states
allowing taxation of reservation Indians. 9 '
Read against the Williams and McClanahan decisions, these four
post-McClanahan cases indicate that where some direct assertion of
tribal sovereignty is involved, sovereignty doctrine is a primary consideration. However, where the state is seeking to exert its own authority, the first consideration should be whether the state has even
been granted the power to act. In essence, the Supreme Court
appears to be employing a review doctrine similar to those doctrines
it often resorts to in deciding an issue without having to pass upon
questions of constitutionality, 9 s i.e., if it can dispose of the issue of
the state's authority to act without having to decide any questions of
tribal sovereign power, it will do so. Where the tribe is directly asserting a sovereign power, however, issues of sovereignty must be faced.
90. 419 U.S. at 557.
91. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
92. 425 U.S. at 475, 483.

93. 426 U.S. at 376.
94. Id. at 393.
95. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936), where Justice Brandeis,
in a concurring opinion, sets out seven such doctrines.
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C. Culturocentric and Politicocentric Bias in Judicial and
Congressional Transactions with Indian Sovereignty

Sovereignty arises out of different circumstances among different
peoples and the manner in which it is manifested may consequently
differ.9 6 Such differences are often not perceived, or self-deceptively

not admitted, thus posing an obstacle to understanding the problems
which are imbedded in social and political matrices far different from
one's own. The result is to impose one's own views of what is felt
ought to be on what is. This ethnocentrism has certainly compounded the federal and state governments' problems over Indian
relations, and even permeates the views of the federal judiciary in
generally unrecognized fashion. For example, under the federal judicial view of sovereignty the people are the ultimate sovereign who
have delegated their sovereign powers to the state and federal govern-

ments with the Constitution indicating how those powers are to be
distributed and exercised. 9 7 This view is part of the bedrock of

federal constitutional interpretation. The courts' analyses have retained this traditional perspective even though they have been deferential toward tribal customs and law whenever passing on some
action involving an Indian tribal government. 9" This can lead to an
96. See generally, e.g., B. De Jouvenel, Sovereignty (J. Huntington trans. 1957); I. Delupis, International Law and the Independent State 3-18 (1974); H. Heller, La Soberania (M.
de la Cueva trans. 1965). The very meaning of "sovereignty" has varied with its social and
historical context. See, e.g., D. Nini6, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the
Practice of the United Nations 2, n. 2 (1970) (discussing sovereignty in classical Greece and
Rome). The roots of contemporary notions of sovereignty date back to the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. Id. at 3, n. 4. Despite the emergence of broad modern theories of
sovereignty, the actual manner in which sovereignty arises and is manifested still varies. Cf
Kohn, The Sovereignty of Liechtenstein, 61 Am. J. Int. L. 547, 549 (1967), with C. Baroch,
The Soviet Doctrine of Sovereignty (1970).
97. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-405 (1819):
The government of the Union, then ... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people .... [I t emanates from them. Its powers are granted by
them.... The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it,
would seem.., apparent....
and Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401 (1857):
[A]lthough [the government of the United States] is sovereign and supreme in its appropriate sphere of action, yet it does not possess all the powers
which usually belong to the sovereignty .... Certain specified powers, enumerated in the Constitution, have been conferred on it; and neither the legislative,
executive, nor judicial departments ... can lawfully exercise any authority
beyond the limits marked out by the Constitution.
See also text accompanying notes 167-169 infra.
98. See, e.g., the Supreme Court's language in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game,
391 U.S. 392 (1968) (probing customary modes and places of fishing by Indians in adjudicating Indian fishing rights).

Summer 1977]

JURISDICTION ON INDIAN LAND

173

improper outcome 9 9 or to incorrect reasoning.' 00
99. See, e.g., Minnesota Comment, supra note 45 (questioning federal court's actions in
applying one-man, one vote principal to tribal election).
100. As an example, consider the language and analysis employed in adjudicating various
parties' rights to participate in a tribal trust fund distribution in the Cherokee Intermarriage
Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906). Examining applicable Cherokee law, the Supreme Court wrote at
203 U.S. 84-85:
Assuming that the [Cherokee] NationalCouncil had authority under the Cherokee constitution of 1839 and the amendments of 1866 to confer on white
intermarried citizens the privilege of purchasing a right in the soil and funds of
the Nation, that privilege was withdrawn in two years. . .. As to the [Negro]
Freedmen, their participation in property distribution was secured by the
terms of the treaty of 1866, ...and of the constitutionalamendments thereupon adopted. The Court of Claims referred to them thus ...:"[The constitutional amendment! is not necessarily prospective, and does not impose
limitations upon the legislative power with regard to the naturalization .. . of
aliens as citizens [by the Cherokees]. Under the policy of the Cherokees
citizenship and communal ownership were distinct things. The citizen who
annually received an annuity derived from the communal fund.., and the
citizen who never received a dollar from the fund or never so much as thought
of receiving it, formed a concrete object lesson in constitutional law [with
respect to distinguishing citizenship from communal property ownership] not
easily effaced from the common mind." (Emphasis supplied.)
After implicitly finding the 1866 amendments were properly adopted, the Court concluded
that except for two persons who purchased rights to share in the distribution, no nonIndians intermarried into the tribe were entitled to participate. It is curious that the Court
did not conclude the 1866 amendments were invalid because their adoption violated Cherokee constitutional procedure: that constitution required amendments to be promulgated
among tribal members six months before being voted on; if the amendments were approved
by the tribal membership, two-thirds of each branch of the tribe's bicameral legislature also
had to approve, whereupon the amendments became law. Cherokee National Council, The
Act of Union Between the Eastern and Western Cherokee, the Constitution and Amendments, and the Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Passed During the Session of 1868 and
Subsequent Sessions 4 (1870). However, the 1866 amendments were approved in advance
by the tribal legislature and subsequently ratified by a convention of the Cherokee peopleapparently to bypass the six month constitutional waiting period needed to make them
effective. See id. at 17-18. Manifestly unconstitutionally adopted under standards of federal
constitutional interpretation, e.g., cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) ("Certainly, allthose who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of
every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void.") and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) ("The language
of the [third article of the Constitution] is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the
legislature .... [C] ongress could not, without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it
into operation."), it is fairly certain that the amendments' validity was raised before the
Supreme Court. Brief for Appellants at 13, Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76
(1906). The Court could have easily concluded the amendments were.validly adopted by
viewing the Cherokee constitution of 1839 not as a binding document with respect to
distribution and exercise of tribal sovereign powers-the federal constitutional approachbut, rather, as a more fluid document which was generally to be adhered to yet which could
be deviated from at the behest of the tribal legislature provided the tribal membership
ultimately approved. Prevented from adopting such an approach by its politicocentric and
culturocentric view of sovereignty, the Court could only apply traditional constitutional
analysis and language.
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Exercise of a federal constitutional perspective in relation to Indian affairs has not been confined to the judiciary. The early lack of
a constitution by most Indian tribes' 0 ' for whom governing authority was often vested in institutions more or less unfamiliar to nonIndians-institutions such as a tribal council or non-hereditary leaders
chosen by band or tribal consensus for life-apparently triggered a
congressional desire to make familiar the unfamiliar. The inevitable
result was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 which not only
provided needed reforms with respect to Indian landholdings, but
also encouraged Indian tribes to remold their traditional institutions
of government into constitutional ones. 02
The Indian Reorganization Act provided that acceptance of its
provisions was to be optional.'3 For those tribes which accepted
the provisions, the act specified:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall
have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an
appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective
when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe,
or of the adult Indians residing on such reservation, as the case may
be, at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the
Interior under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.' 04
101. Notable exceptions were the constitutions of the Iroquois Confederacy and the
members of the Five Civilized Tribes. The constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy predates
the federal Constitution by an approximate two hundred years, but differs from the federal
Constitution in that it remained oral until the nineteenth century, when it was transcribed.
W. Moquin, Constitution of the Iroquois Federation, Great Documents in American Indian
History 20-26 (1973); A. C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, 184 New York
State Museum Bulletin (1916). The constitutions of the members of the Five Civilized
Tribes post-date the federal Constitution by short periods of time and have occasionally
figured in judicial litigation. See, e.g., Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation and United States,
28 Ct. Cl. 281 (1893); Ex parte Tiger, 2 Ind. T. 41, 47 S.W. 304 (1898); McCurtain v.
Grady, 1 Ind. T. 107, 38 S.W. 65 (1896).
102. See note 67 supra. At least one author has argued that the act signaled the extirpation of Indian sovereignty. W. Schaab, Indian IndustrialDevelopment and the Courts, 8 Nat.
Res. J. 303, 306-30 (1968) delivered a resounding attack on Indian sovereignty, arguing for
unrestricted application of the Constitution to Indians and adoption of a new Indian policy
based on congressional attitudes favorable to assimilation. No consideration was given the
great fluctuations in congressional policies, the countervailing stabilizing influence of the
federal judicial approach which has been firmly rooted in sovereignty doctrine, or the
drastic consequences sure to follow the wholesale unleashing of contemporary society upon
an Indian population committed to different values.
103. 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1970) specifies:
Sections 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466 to 470, 471 to 473, 474, 475, 476
to 478, and 479 of this title shall not apply to any reservation wherein a
majority of the adult Indians, voting at a special election duly called by the
Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application. It shall be the
duty of the Secretary of the Interior, within one year after June 18, 1934, to
call such an election, which election shall be held by secret ballot upon thirty
days' notice.
104. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
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Not all tribes accepted the terms of the Indian Reorganization
Act.' 05 Nor did all those tribes which accepted the act adopt constitutions, a forbearance which was plainly sanctioned by the language of the act as set out above.' 06 For those tribes which do not
have a constitution adopted pursuant to the terms of the Indian
Reorganization Act, the traditional modes of exercising their internal
sovereignty are not obfuscated by tribal constitutional standards and
remain limited only by applicable federal constitutional provisions,
treaties and acts.
Those tribes which adopted a constitution pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act must not only look to applicable federal constitutional provisions, treaties and acts, but they must also respond to
the strictures of their tribal constitutions. If some power they seek to
exercise has been addressed by a tribal constitutional provision, then
it must be exercised in accordance with the dictates of appropriate
tribal constitutional interpretation.' 0 7 The federal courts will often
105. During the statutory period for accepting or rejecting the act, 181 tribes representing a total of 129,750 Indians voted to accept its provision, while 77 tribes representing a
total of 86,365 Indians (including the approximately 45,000 Navajo Indians) voted to reject
the provisions. U.S. Indian Service, Department of the Interior, Tribal Relations Pamphlet
No. 1, Ten Years of Tribal Government Under I.R.A. 3 (1947).
106. By 1947, thirteen years after passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, only 93
tribes had adopted constitutions. Id.
107. Pursuing this argument, if it appears that a tribal constitution's due process of law
provision is applicable to a particular tribal governmental action, "due process of law" must
be determined in the context of what "due processes" were customarily observed within the
tribal socio-governmental framework. As Justice Cardozo commented in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116-17 (1934):
Due process of law requires that proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a
relative, not an absolute concept. It is fairness with reference to particular
conditions or particular results.... What is fair in one set of circumstances
may be an act of tyranny in others. (Citations omitted.)
See also. Spencer v. State of Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967) (quoting Snyder). Thus, if it
has been customary within a particular tribe for the tribal council to unilaterally determine
which tribal members can attend a particular ceremonial function of social and religious
significance, exclusion of a particular individual from the function, even if effected unilaterally without a hearing, and even though affecting certain tribal property rights or status,
would not be a violation of due process. Cf., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir.
1973) (equal protection clause of Indian Civil Rights Act not violated by higher blood
requirement for holding tribal office than for tribal membership).
One might argue that where a tribal constitution uses the phrase "due process," the
traditional federal interpretation of that phrase has been incorporated by reference. This
argument merits weight when applied to state and non-Indian local governments as these
entities and their participants share certain fundamental beliefs concerning the process and
structure of democratic majoritarian government. See text accompanying note 236 infra.
But this argument is generally inappropriate for tribal governments: tribal societies span the
spectrum in terms of cultural assimilation; among even the most assimilated there is often a
peculiar sense of difference; these differences are deeply rooted in political and social
institutions originating in thousands of years of pre-Constitution tradition and environment.
Thus, when a tribal constitution employs the term "due process," there is little certainty
that the complex set of explicit and implicit beliefs accompanying that phrase in non-Indian
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assert jurisdiction to review such exercises of tribal power or tribal

constitutional interpretations where the tribe is arguably subject to
some federal statutory authority.' 08 If examination of tribal constitutional provisions during the course of federal judicial review discloses that those provisions resemble the provisions of the federal
Constitution in some way, it is likely that the federal courts will find
it difficult to resist the application of familiar federal constitutional
standards, whether appropriate or not.' 09 Yet if it is remembered
that the tribal constitutions adopted in accordance with the Indian
Reorganization Act embody not only the format of formal, written
governmental instruments (so strongly approved of by the prevailing
culturocentric and politicocentric societal and governmental attitudes in this country), but also unique Indian attitudes and approaches to substantive and procedural law which are the distillate of
cultural and social experiences which predate the United States by
hundreds, or even thousands of years,'' 0 it follows that federal
courts must endeavor to interpret the actions of tribal governments
in the unique context of tribal customs and traditions, rather than
blindly and analogously apply federal constitutional standards to
tribal constitutions. Thus if a tribe purports to charter a municipality
for non-Indians on Indian land, any potentially applicable tribal constitutional provision must be read in the light of relevant Indian
experience.
Enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968'.. has presented American Indian cultures with their greatest single culturominds and jurisprudence is intended by that term. Incorporation by reference may be
possible, but verbal identity is an insufficient basis for invoking this interpretive tool.
108. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973)
(district court had jurisdiction under Indian Civil Rights Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4)).
Absention is not presently an active doctrine in Indian litigation. See, e.g., Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976). However, one
recent case invoked a rule of exhaustion of tribal remedies. See O'Neal v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973) (Indian Civil Rights Act did not affect generally
recognized policy of preserving authority of tribal courts). But see McCurdy v. Steele, 353
F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) (exception to the exhaustion rule).
109. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) (equal protection
and due process clauses of Indian Civil Rights Act prohibit tribal governments from ignoring
their own election rules); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973)
(Indian Civil Rights Act embraces one-man, one-vote principle which applies where tribe
adopted voting procedures closely paralleling those of Anglo-American law); Daly v. United
States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973) (equal protection clause of Indian Civil Rights Act
prohibits large variation in population among tribal councilman districts). See also Minnesota Comment, supra note 45 (questioning federal court's action in White Eagle as having
created new procedures, not enforcing existing ones).
110. For example, the centuries-old rules governing tribal council procedure and organization at Laguna Pueblo were reduced to written constitutional form in 1908 without
altering the structure of tribal life. F. Cohen, The Legal Conscience 222, 222-23 (1960).
111. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1970).
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centric and politicocentric onslaught of this century. This act
immeasurably enlarged the reach of federal constitutional standards
and reasoning into everyday Indian life and tribal governmental
action, and, unlike the Indian Reorganization Act, is potentially not

restricted in its application to those situations where a tribal constitution is present, or acceptance of the act's statutory provisions has
taken place. Prior to passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Indian
life was governed to a much greater extent by the application of
federal statutory provisions enacted under federal constitutional
authority, than by direct application of federal constitutional provisions. While only certain federal constitutional provisions could be

said to authorize such statutory enactments,' 12 nevertheless, those
constitutional prescriptions were so broad in scope that characterization of federal power over Indian tribes as "plenary" was conceded as "practically justified" by Felix Cohen.' ' ' And yet a certain
check over federal constriction of Indian powers of self-government
and federal control of internal tribal affairs was provided by the fact
that the standards applied to measure tribal actions were predom-

inantly statutory, rather than constitutional.'

Thus, those tribal

112. Cohen observed, supra note 37 at 89:
In addition to the constitutional sources of authority over commerce with
Indian tribes, expenditures for the general welfare, property of the United
States, and treaties ... , other constitutional grants of power have played a
role in Indian litigation. Most important, perhaps, are the power of Congress
to admit new states and (inferentially) to prescribe the terms of such admission, and to make war. Congressional powers of lesser importance . .. include
the power to establish post-roads, to establish tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court, and to establish a "uniform rule of naturalization." (Footnotes omitted.)
113. Id. at 91. But ef. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, No. 75-1301 slip op. at
10 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 1977) ("The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a
plenary nature; but it is not absolute.").
114. For an example of pre-Indian Civil Rights Act restricted application of the Constitution to Indian affairs, see Talton v. Mayes, note 64 supra. The view expressed there
regarding selective fededal constitutional applicability was followed in subsequent federal
decisions. E.g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Res., note 74 supra. Cohen,
supra note 37, at 124 sketched the outlines of pre-Indian Civil Rights Act federal constitutional applicability:
The decision in Talton v. Mayes does not mean that Indian tribes are not
subject to the Constitution. . . . [A]n Indian tribe is subject to the Federal
Constitution in the same sense that the city of New Orleans . . . is ....
The
Federal Constitution prohibits slavery absolutely. This ... applies to an Indian
tribe as well as to a municipal government and it has been held that slaveholding within an Indian tribe became illegal with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. It is, therefore, always pertinent to ask whether an
ordinance of a tribe conflicts with the Constitution ....
Where, however, the
United States Constitution levies particular restraints upon federal courts or
upon Congress, these restraints do not apply to the courts or legislatures of the
Indian tribes. Likewise, particular restraints upon the states are inapplicable to
Indian tribes.
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institutions and social patterns not regulated by Congress were relatively unaffected by federal actions and could thereby be retained.

This was undoubtedly a major factor in the abilities of various Indian
tribes to maintain some semblance of cultural integrity.
By imposing on Indian activities constraints the language of which

is drawn from the First and Fourth through Eighth Amendments,' ' the Indian Civil Rights Act has perturbed the clarity of the standards

to be applied in evaluating tribal actions for propriety. The act can
be read as seeking to impose direct constitutional restraints on tribal
governmental organization and activities previously subject only to

statutory restraints. Yet the degree to which those constitutional
restraints are applicable is uncertain.' 1 6 The decree of applicability
which emerges from the litigation will be important to activities
surrounding reservation leasehold communities. For example, in
Situation 3, a broad interpretation of the "free exercise of religion"
clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act' 1 7 might prohibit tribal action

restricting the practice of witchcraft, and thereby threaten the cultural integrity and psychic well-being of the tribal members.' 18 On

the other hand, a narrow interpretation might produce a loss of
expectation for the non-Indian satanic sect member.
How then, should the Indian Civil Rights Act be interpreted? A
case worth noting in this regard is Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal
It has been held that the guaranty of religious liberty in the First Amendment.., does not protect a resident of New Orleans from religious oppression
by municipal authorities. Neither does it protect the Indian against religious
(Footnotes omitted.)
oppression on the part of tribal authorities ....
Thus, prior to the Indian Civil Rights Act, the provisions of the Constitution authorizing
federal control of Indian affairs were: first, those whose language specifically addressed
Indian affairs (of which there are only two instances-the Article 2, Section 2, clause 2
treaty-making power and the Article 1, Section 8, clause 3 power to regulate commerce with
the Indians); and second, those whose language was not restrictively addressed to limitations
on only the federal government (e.g., the sixth amendment), the states (e.g., article 1,
section 10, clause 3), some other non-Indian entity (e.g., the second amendment), or a
combination thereof (e.g., the fourteenth amendment). The relevant constitutional provisions were relied on chiefly to support federal statutory regulation of Indian affairs, rather
than directly invoked to limit those affairs (as was unsuccessfully attempted in Talton v.
Mayes). Consequently, Indian affairs were largely governed by statutory, not constitutional
restrictions, and those affairs went untrammeled wherever Congress had not acted. Even
where Congress acted pursuant to an appropriate constitutionally-granted power, however,
it was still subject to ordinary constitutional restraints. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (attack grounded in fifth amendment).
115. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
116. See Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the ConstitutionalStatus of Tribal Governments, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343 (1969).
117. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970).
118. See, e.g., A. Ortiz, The Tewa World 15, 70-72, 87, 108-9, 140 n. 4, 157 n. 6, 163 n.
12, 168 n. 10 (1969) for a description of witchcraft and associated fears among the Rio
Grande Tewa Pueblo tribes.
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Community.' '9 Lower Elwha was a suit by an Indian against his
tribal council seeking to set aside its cancellation of an assignment to
him of a tract of tribal land for failure of the council to comport
with due process and equal protection as set forth in the Indian Civil
Rights Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the act
broadly, stating in a footnote:
During oral argument, . . appellee urged that due process within
the meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 1302 did not have the same meaning as
traditional notions of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
There may be some provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act that
under some circumstances may have a modified meaning because of
the special historical nature of particular tribal customs or organization. However, this is not one of them. The Hearings on H.R. 15419
and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.: "Rights
of Members of Indian Tribes," at 17 (1968) .... state that:
"... any Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local
self-government shall, with certain exceptions, be subject
to the same limitations and restraints ... imposed on the
Government ...by the Constitution."
It thus appears [that] ...it was the clear intention of [the House
Subcommittee] that the due process restrictions of the bill should
be interpreted in the same way when applied to a tribe as when
applied to the United States or to the states.
The legislative history states:
"... the substitute bill would grant to the American
Indians enumerated constitutional rights and protection
from arbitrary action in their relationship with tribal
governments,.. ." 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
p. 1864 (1968).2o

The language quoted from the legislative history of the Indian Civil
Rights Act by the court of appeals can support an alternative construction of that act, i.e., that the purposes of the act-"to protect
individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.

.

. by placing certain limitations on an Indian tribe ... the

same as those imposed on the Government of the United States"' 2 1
119. 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973). The suit alleged violations of equal protection and
due process under the Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Lower Elwha tribal
constitution.
120. Id. at 202 n. 4.
121. The quoted language is taken from a discussion of the purpose of the constitutional
language in the Senate version of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Hearings on H.R. 15419 and
Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968).

180
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-are to be served by applying the constitutional language to tribal
governments in the light of tribal customs and traditions. And where
such application would help preserve some aspect of traditional tribal
organization or structure, it would seem compelled by statements of
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights who introduced
the Senate version of the act:
I realize that the All Indian Pueblo Council of New Mexico has
voiced serious objections to the provisions of [the proposed act
which employ language taken from the First and Fourth through
Eighth Amendments] and has asked to be exempt from that Title.
In all sincerity, I do not believe that [their fears] can be justified.
The Pueblo Indians have a rich, colorful form of government
founded on tradition and wise experience. In no conceivable way is
it my intention, through the provisions of [this act], to hamper,
weaken or destroy the Pueblo tribal traditions or any Indian tribal
governments in this Nation.122 (Emphasis supplied.)
A number of decisions have adopted a harmonious interpretive viewpoint.1 23 Such a viewpoint is further supported by the rule established for Indian litigation involving statutory interpretation in
Squire v. Capoeman' 24 that doubtful statutory expressions relating
to Indian affairs are to be resolved in favor of the Indians.' 2 5
Regardless of how the Indian Civil Rights Act is ultimately interpreted, it can only be construed as confirming the continued vitality
of Indian sovereignty doctrine: the legislative history and the act
itself refer repeatedly to tribal powers of self-government.' 2 6 This
congressional recognition of Indian sovereignty is a factor which
must be given a strong, if not determinative role in future Indian
litigation.
122. Statement of the Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., U.S. Senator from North Carolina, concerning the amended Senate version of the act. Id. at 134.
123. E.g., Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971) (Indian
Civil Rights Act concerned primarily with administration of tribal justice, not particular
aspects of tribal structure or office-holding); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D. S.D.
1974) (meaning and application of Indian Civil Rights Act with respect to tribes necessarily
differs from established Anglo-American jurisprudential meaning); Wounded Head v. Tribal
Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Res., 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975). (equal
protection clause of Indian Civil Rights Act not coextensive with Equal Protection clause).
124. 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (suit by Indians to recover federal income tax assessed and paid
on capital gains from sale of timber removed from individual land allotment made under
General Allotment Act).
125. Id. at 9.
126. Compare the language quoted from the legislative history by the Lower Elwha
court, in text accompanying note 120 supra, and the first phrase of the Indian Bill of
Rights, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970), with the language found in Worcester v. Georgia, in text
accompanying note 41 supra, and in Crow Dog, 112 U.S. 556 at 568-69. The latter two
cases demonstrate the equivalency in federal litigation of powers of "local self-government"
and "Indian sovereignty" over internal affairs.
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D. The Reach and Content of the Doctrine of Indian Sovereignty
Having concluded that Indian sovereignty is a living doctrine, the
standards to be applied to the exercise of tribal sovereign powers
must be distinguished from the actual reach and content of those
powers. The standards govern the manner in which tribal powers of
sovereignty are exercised; the reach and content of those powers
indicates the spectrum of objectives which such powers can be used
to accomplish. Standards for the exercise of tribal sovereign powers
are found in the provisions of tribal constitutions, or the traditions
and customs of the tribe (especially for non-constitutional tribal
governments such as those of some of the Rio Grande pueblos), or
both-since the full panoply of tribal powers to which the standards
are to be applied may not be fully enumerated in a tribal constitution. Standards may also be imposed from without by federal con1
stitutional, statutory or regulatory authority. 2 7
The reach of tribal sovereign powers has been reduced to zero for
external powers. 1 28 However, with respect to internal powers of
sovereignty, i.e., the powers of local self-government,' 2 9 their reach
should be unlimited within their sphere of influence, except to the
extent checked by applicable federal statutory or regulatory provisions. ' 30 Thus, except where so checked, the tribal government
should be able to undertake any action which is necessary to the
administration of internal tribal affairs, assuming the exercise of that
power has not been prohibited by applicable federal or tribal law,
and assuming the action is conducted in conformity with the standards applicable to the tribal power involved. This conclusion is
strengthened by observing that tribal sovereign powers over internal
affairs are not divided in any way resembling the federal-state dichotomy prescribed by the federal Constitution-a dichotomy which
127. An example of the standards which may be imposed by federal regulatory provisions issued pursuant to federal statutory authority is 25 U.S.C. § 454 (1970) (relating to
Secretary of Interior's authority to set standards for contracts between tribes and nonIndian entities).
128. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
129. See note 126 supra.
130. There are no applicable federal constitutional provisions here because the Constitution does not address the objectives for which tribal powers can be exercised, with the
possible exception of commerce. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress power to
regulate commerce with Indians). Federal regulatory provisions authorized by statutes such
as that cited in note 127 supra can, of course, impose standards or affect the reach of tribal
sovereign powers by virtue of Congress' plenary authority over Indian affairs. See text
accompanying note 113 supra.
The "sphere of influence" language of the text appears in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("[t] he government of the Union, though limited in its powers,
is supreme within its sphere of action."), and is applied by analogy, cognizant of the dangers
involved in reasoning by analogy where Indian sovereignty is concerned.
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limits the sovereign powers possessed by each-but instead, are gathered under one governmental roof. The consequence of the absence
of a federal-state dichotomy should be to permit a tribal government
to undertake actions with respect to internal tribal affairs which
would not be analogously possible for either the federal or state
governments.1 3
The content of Indian sovereignty is the range of powers inherently at the disposal of a tribal government by virtue of its internal
sovereignty. The federal courts have found a wide variety of such
powers.' 32 Other sovereign powers over internal affairs have been
recognized in various Indian treaties.' II Significantly, some Indian
131. Cf. text accompanying notes 167-169 infra. An example might be the extra-constitutional procedure used to adopt the 1866 amendments to the Cherokee constitution. See
note 100 supra.
132. Powers judicially recognized have included the powers to: (1) define powers and
duties of tribal officials, and the manner in which tribal authority is invoked and exerted,
e.g., Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315 (1927); (2) nullify a provision in a treaty
with the federal government by contravening tribal enactment, e.g., the Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. 115 (1904); (3) determine tribal membership, e.g., Delaware Indians v.
Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127 (1904); (4) determine rights of participation in tribal
property, e.g., Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); (5) regulate divorce, e.g.,
Barnett v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 19 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1927); (6) prescribe the manner of
inheritance, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); (7) determine adoption rights, e.g.,
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); (8) impose license requirements for doing
business on reservation land, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); (9) impose
property tax on non-Indians on Indian land, e.g., Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904);
(10) exclude non-Indians from Indian land, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D. Ark.
1885); (11) determine validity of contracts between tribal members, e.g., Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. 426 (8th Cir. 1893); (12) exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses involving
Indians or Indians and non-Indians, committed on Indian land, e.g., United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542 (1909); Donnelly v.
United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
133. In general, such powers cannot be read as deriving from the federal government.
The treaties were negotiated between political, albeit not necessarily military, equals, see
text accompanying notes 40-42 supra, so it would be presumptuous to see them as providing
grants of power from the federal government to the tribes. This would also contravene the
rule of Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) that doubtful expressions in the
treaties are to be interpreted in favor of the Indians. Furthermore, what may have been
viewed as federal grants of power in the past, whether in statute or treaty, may actually have
been nothing more than transmutations of Indian sovereign powers through the imposition
of standards on their exercise or limitations on their reach.
Powers over tribal internal affairs recognized in various treaties include the powers to: (1)
punish non-Indians attempting to settle on tribal land without authorization, e.g., Treaty of
Jan. 21, 1785 with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa and Ottowa Nations, 7 Stat. 16, 17;
(2) allow Indians of another tribe to live on tribal land, and to dispossess the same, e.g.,
Treaty of Jan. 9, 1789 with the Wiandot, Delaware, Ottowa, Chippewa, Pattawatima and
Sac Nations, 7 Stat. 28, 32; (3) separate and remain distinct from other parts of same Indian
nation, e.g., Treaty of Sept. 13, 1815 with the portion of the Sac Nation Indians residing on
the Missouri River, 7 Stat. 134; (4) give a power of attorney for conducting tribal business,
e.g., Treaty of July 8, 1817 with the Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 156; (5) change tribal laws
and system of government, e.g., id.; (6) lease tribal property to non-Indians, e.g., Treaty of
Oct. 19, 1818 with the Chickasaw Nation, 7 Stat. 192, 193; (7) establish tribal schools, e.g.,
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treaties recognize tribal powers to: charter a corporate entity; 1 3 4
undertake public works and improvements for the benefit of the
tribe;' ' 5 and determine sites for the location of tribal industries-a
zoning analog.' 36 The range of recognized tribal powers indicates
that federal regulation of those powers has only touched the surface
of a vast reservoir of tribal powers, leaving a huge reserve of sovereign
powers at the command of tribal governments.
Indian Sovereignty and State Jurisdiction
This discussion has so far centered on Indian sovereignty and its
federal restrictions which emanate from a long sequence of congressional-judicial interactions. However, the shaping of Indian sovereignty doctrine has not entirely been confined to the arena of Indianfederal transactions. Congress has periodically authorized state
jurisdiction over certain tribal activities.' 3 Of equal significance,
independent of any explicit congressional authorization, state jurisdiction over some matters involving Indians has been viewed as
proper.' 3 8 Felix Cohen summarized:
While the general rule ... is that plenary authority over Indian
affairs rests in the Federal Government to the exclusion of state
Treaty of Oct. 20, 1820 with the Choctaw Nation, 7 Stat. 210, 212; (8) create tribal police
force to enforce tribal law on tribal land against both Indians and non-Indians, e.g., id. at
213; (9) void a treaty provision with the federal government, e.g., Treaty of Jan. 24, 1826
with the Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 286; (10) prohibit non-Indians from conducting business on
Indian land or introducing liquor onto Indian land, e.g., id. at 335; (11) invest tribal funds,
e.g., Treaty of Oct. 20, 1832 with the Chickasaw Nation, 7 Stat. 381, 385; (12) prescribe
property rights, rights of inheritance and rights of alienation, e.g., Treaty of May 24, 1834
with the Chickasaw Nation, 7 Stat. 450, 452-53.
134. See text accompanying notes 189-202 infra.
135. The Treaty of Apr. 23, 1836 with the Wyandot Tribe of Ohio, 7 Stat. 502, provides:
Art. 5. Such portion of the monies arising from the sales [of Indian land] as
the chiefs may deem necessary for the rebuilding of mills, repair and improvement of roads, establishing schools, and other laudable public objects for the
improvement of their condition shall be properly applied under their direction ....
136. Treaty of Oct. 6, 1818 with the Miame Nation of Indians, 7 Stat. 189, 191:
Art. 5....
The United States will cause to be built for the Miamis one grist-mill and
one saw-mill, at such proper sites as the chiefs of the nation may select. ...
137. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970) provides:
Each of the States ... listed ... shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of
action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State ... has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such
State ... that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State ....
138. See, e.g., In re Wolf, 27 F. 606, 610 (D. Ark. 1886) (conspiracy by tribal members
to obtain money from tribe by false pretenses).
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governments, [there are] two major exceptions to this general rule:
First, where Congress has expressly declared that certain powers over
Indian affairs shall be exercised by the states, and second, where the
matter involved non-Indian questions sufficient to ground state jurisdiction.
In proceeding to analyze this latter exception to the general rule,
we may note that ...the sovereignty of a state over its own territory is plenary and therefore the fact that Indians are involved ...
does not ipso facto terminate state power. State power is terminated
only if the matter ... falls within the constitutional scope of exclusive federal authority.
A case in which the factors of situs, person and subject matter all
point to exclusive federal jurisdiction [is one where] the basis of
exclusive federal power is clear. . . . [W] here all three factors point
away from federal jurisdiction, the power of the state is clear. There
exists, however, a broad twilight zone in which one or two of the
three elements noted ... point to federal power and the remainder
to state power. These1 3are the situations which require analysis ....
(Footnotes omitted.) 9

The doctrine of Indian sovereignty pronounced in Worcester v.
Georgia' 40 appears to have been formulated in response to the
Supreme Court's perceptions of the potentially octopodal nature of
state jurisdiction. 1"' Nevertheless, the recognition and enlargement
of state jurisdiction with respect to matters in the twilight zone
where the factors of situs, person and subject matter noted by Cohen
do not add up to a clear case of either state or federal jurisdiction has
steadily proceeded. The Williams v. Lee," ' Organized Village of
44
Kake v. Egan,"' and Warren Trading Post v. Tax Commission'
trilogy of cases signaled the beginning of recent attempts by the
Supreme Court to bring order to the jurisdictional issues in this
murky area.

Two themes run through the trilogy: federal preemption of state
jurisdiction over Indian affairs, and the scope of Indian soverA common pre-Williams presumption had been that the
eignty."'
general federal interest in Indian affairs preempted all state attempts
to exercise power over Indian affairs on Indian reservations, except
139. Cohen, supra note 37, at 119.
140. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
141. It was the assertion of state jurisdiction which precipitated the litigation in Worcester. See note 39 supra.
142. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
143. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
144. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
145. See California Comment, supra note 45, at 477-78.
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when the state acted with express congressional authorization.' 46
Williams, an action originally brought in Arizona state court to collect on a debt contracted on a reservation between an Indian debtor
and a non-Indian trader-creditor, left open the possibility that the
state might act with respect to Indians on reservations in the absence
of explicit congressional authorization-provided the states' actions
did not infringe on tribal rights of self-government.

"'7

Williams

upset the presumption of federal preemption, but this outcome was
consistent with the views of Cohen, who had concluded:
(1) In matters involving only Indians on an Indian reservation, the
state has no jurisdiction in the absence of specific legislation by
Congress.
(2) In all other cases, the state has jurisdiction unless there is involved a subiect matter of specialfederal concern.148

In Kake, a challenge to the applicability to Indians of Alaskan laws
regulating off-reservation fishing, the Supreme Court intimated that a
state may exert off-reservation jurisdiction over Indians without congressional authorization wherever the federal government has not
acted.1 9 Kake's outcome was no less consistent with Cohen's conclusions than Williams. However, neither case indicated what factors
would give rise to federal preemption, i.e., neither elaborated on the
subject matter factor of Cohen's situs, person, subject matter analysis
other than to indicate that general federal interest in Indian reservation affairs was not enough.
Warren indicated that the boundaries for federal preemption were
those defining areas covered by acts of Congress or strong congressional policies concerned with particular reservations.' ' o The Warren
court struck down Arizona's attempt to tax the gross income of a
non-Indian trader doing business on a reservation because it found
that the requisite acts and policy existed.' ' '
The relationship between Indian sovereignty and state authority,
the second theme of the trilogy, has already been briefly adverted
146. See, e.g., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 501
(1958) (Department of the Interior revision of Cohen's original work).
147. "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them." 358 U.S. at 220.
148. Cohen, supra note 37, at 121.
149. [Elven on reservations state laws may be applied to Indians unless such
application would interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law. . . . State authority over Indians is yet
more extensive or activities ... not on any reservation.
369 U.S. at 75.
150. 380 U.S. at 690-91, 691 n.18.
151. Id. at 691-92.
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to. 12 Williams allowed states to extend jurisdiction onto reservations where this did not interfere with tribal self-government.' '
Kake turned on federal preemption and did not address Indian selfgovernment, perhaps because the Supreme Court was unable to perceive self-government issues in a case involving off-reservation Indian
activities.' ' Warren would have permitted discussion of Indian sovereignty, but instead, the Court relied on preemption principles for
its decision. In consequence, neither Kake nor Warren added substance to Williams' allusion to the existence of independent tribal
self-government interests which might be strong enough, of themselves, to block attempts to exercise state jurisdiction on Indian
reservations. The trilogy's lack of strong emphasis on Indian sovereignty is the apparent result of the Court's striving for narrow bases
for its decisions prior to placing Indian sovereignty in a newer doctrinal context-a task left to succeeding companion cases, McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission... and Mescalero Indian Tribe v.
Jones.' 5 6
In McClanahan the court interpreted the treaties and statutes
which provide the skeletal framework for post-trilogy preemption in
a broad manner and to the favor of the Indians. It concluded that, at
least with respect to Indians residing on reservations and deriving
their income solely from reservation sources, the state of Arizona
could not impose an income tax.' s 7 On the subject of Indian sovereignty, the Court indicated that tribal interests in self-government,
while not determinative by themselves of on-reservation state jurisdiction, were required to be considered-although largely as a "backdrop"-in conjunction with the treaties and statutes relevant to
federal preemption.' 58 McClanahan, thereby, provided some independent weight for Indian interests in self-government.
Mescalero, like Williams, rejected the notion that a general federal
interest in Indian affairs preempted state jurisdiction over tribal
152. See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
153. See note 147 supra.
154. See California Comment, supra note 45, at 478. One authority has indicated that
Kake must be carefully distinguished because of the peculiar legislative position of the
Alaska Indians. See Comment, Indians-StateJurisdictionover Real Estate Developments on
Tribal Lands, 2 N.M.L. Rev. 81, 85 (1974).

155. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
156. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
157. 411 U.S. at 173-79.
158. "The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read." Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
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enterprises.' 1 s 9 In discussing Indian sovereignty, the Mescalero court
summarized Kake, Williams and McClanahan in slipshod fashion:
The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester ...has given way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes . . . as they, taken
together, affect the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government. See McClanahan, ... Kake.... The upshot has

been the repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even
on reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application
would interfere with reservation self-government or would impair
a
16
right granted or reserved by federal law. (Citations omitted.) 0

These cases did not squarely hold that state laws may be applied
unless that application would interfere with Indian self-government
or federal law;1 61 they were more conditional, indicating that noninterference with self-government or federal authority was a minimum precondition for application of state laws, thus leaving room
for consideration of other factors. The Court would have been more
clearly on the mark by simply referring to McClanahan which, unlike
Mescalero, was directly concerned with on-reservation state jurisdiction. While true, as was pointed out in Mescalero, that McClanahan
involved the "special area of state taxation," ' 62 it is equally true
that McClanahan's preemption analysis lends itself readily to other
situations involving on-reservation assertions of state power, and
probably was intended to be so applied.
Mescalero did underscore McClanahan'sindication that there exist
differences between federal preemption as applied to Indian reservation activities and activities off the reservation in that federal preemption provides a larger protective penumbra on the reservation
than off.'63 Examining the relevant law, presumably from this perspective, the Mescalero court concluded that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 did not permit New Mexico to collect a use tax for
permanent improvements to an off-reservation tribal ski resort, but
did allow collection of a gross receipts tax.
159. 411 U.S. at 147-48. The Mescalero court also rejected the argument that the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 "rendered the Tribe's off-reservation ski resort a federal instrumentality constitutionally immune from state taxes of all sorts." Id. at 150.
160. Id. at 148.
161. See text accompanying notes 147-149 supra.
162. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S at 148.
163. "But tribal activities conducted outside the reservation present different considerations. 'State authority over Indians is yet more extensive over activities ... not on any
reservation.' "Id. (quoting Kake, 369 U.S. at 75).
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In sum, Mescalero and McClanahan gave Indian interests in selfgovernment post-Williams impetus. They also established a difference
in breadth between on-reservation and off-reservation federal preemption, thus refining Cohen's situs and subject matter factors. With
respect to the person factor it is important that both cases involved
only Indians as the objects of attempted exercises of state jurisdiction. McClanahan clearly indicated that where both Indians and nonIndians were the objects of jurisdictional contention there would be
greater difficulty in parsing out the jurisdiction.' 64
Confirmation of the Mescalero-MeClanahan position favoring
greater on-reservation subject matter preemptive powers, as well as a
boost for Indian sovereignty, was provided by the 1975 Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Mazurie.I 6 I There the Court held
constitutional a federal statute which gave the tribes involved authority to regulate alcoholic beverages. Pursuant to the statute the tribes
had prevented liquor dealers who lacked a tribal license from selling
liquor on the reservation, even though their tavern was located on
privately owned land within the reservation. In discussing the federal
interests involved and Indian sovereignty doctrine, the Mazurie court
stated:
This Court has recognized limits on the authority of Congress to
delegate its legislative power. . . . Thus it is an important aspect of
this case that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,
Worcester v. Georgia ...; they are "a separate people" possessing
"the power of regulating their internal and social relations... "
United States v. Kagama ...; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n ....
...These same cases ... make clear that when Congress delegated
its authority to control the introduction of alcoholic beverages into
Indian country, it did so to entities which possess a certain degree of
independent authority over matters that affect the internal and
social relations of tribal life ....We need not decide whether this
164. [Elven if the State's premise [that taxing individual Indians-as opposed to
the tribe or reservation -does not infringe on tribal self-government] were
accepted, we reject the suggestion that the Williams test was meant to apply
in this situation .... [CI ases applying the Williams test have dealt principally
with situations involving non-Indians. . . . In these situations, both the tribe
and the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing
that the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal selfgovernment would be affected.
411 U.S. at 179.
165. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
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independent authority is itself sufficient for the tribes to impose
[their ordinance requiring tribal liquor licenses] . It is necessary only
to state that the independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to
protect Congress' decision to vest in tribal councils this portion of its
own authority .... Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export

Corp.... (Citations omitted.)'66

Several conclusions may possibly be drawn from the Mazurie language, above, which cites United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. 1 6 7 as support for the proposition that Indian sovereignty can
prevent invalidation of certain delegations of congressional power to
tribal governments:
(1) While residual Indian sovereignty is strong enough to govern
activities involving internal affairs, it must be exercised in conformity
with applicable externally-imposed federal restrictions. Just as the
1
President possesses independent external powers of sovereignty,' 6 8
the Indian tribes possess independent internal sovereign powers. The
exercise of these powers is subject to limitations in both cases: for
the President, there are constitutional limitations which regulate internal powers and affairs and can thus reach the internal actions the
President must take to oversee external affairs; for Indian tribes, the
limitations come from the legislative branch of the government
166. Id. at 556-57. The citation of McClanahan in conjunction with Kagama and Worcester in the language quoted from Mazurie underlines McClanahan'sattribution of independent weight to tribal interests in self-government.
167. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In Curtiss-Wright, a congressional resolution provided that if
the President found prohibiting the sale of arms to certain countries engaged in armed
conflict would contribute to re-establishing peace, and if the President made a proclamation
to that effect, it would be unlawful to make such a sale except under conditions the
President prescribed. After the proclamation was issued, the defendant, Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, was indicted for conspiring to sell arms in violation of the congressional
resolution and presidential proclamation. The defendant demurred, claiming the congressional delegation of authority to the President was invalid because its grant of discretion to
him abdicated an essential legislative function. On appeal the Supreme Court noted that the
resolution related to external (foreign) affairs and elaborated on the nature of internal and
external sovereign powers: constitutional restriction of federal authority to the enumerated
powers only applied to internal powers; the Constitution absorbed the internal federal
powers from the states, leaving with them the unenumerated internal powers; pre-constitutional state powers never included powers over external affairs since these passed directly to
the federal government from the Crown through the Continental Congress, and then to the
executive-the nation's representative in external affairs. Id. at 315-19. Since the proclamation involved the joint exercise of external powers of sovereignty and delegated internal
legislative powers, the resulting dual authority allowed the President discretionary latitude
over external affairs which could not be tolerated for internal affairs. Id. at 320-21. This
latitude was also required by the practicalities of overseeing foreign relations. Id. But see
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
Yale L.J. 467 (1946) (criticizing the theory of extra-constitutional external powers).
168. See note 167 supra.
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which reduced to zero the reach of their external sovereign powers
and assumed guardianship of their external affairs.' 6 9
(2) Indian sovereignty has an enhancing or synergistic effect in
combination with the assertion of federal authority. This could mean
that even where the exercise of federal authority has not preempted
some activity involving Indians, the combination of a small amount
of delegated federal authority and active exercise of Indian sovereign
powers relative to that activity may so occupy that field that the
exercise of state jurisdiction is precluded.
(3) The most obvious conclusion is that the existence of Indian
sovereignty allows Congress to vest a portion of its legislative authority with fewer restrictions, or to a larger extent than it could with
respect to other entities, when an Indian tribe is involved.
In short, Mazurie reaffirmed Indian sovereignty doctrine and may
have broadened federal preemption doctrine, at least with respect to
on-reservation matters, by pointing to a previously unilluminated
enhancing or synergistic function of Indian sovereignty where Congress delegates authority to tribal governments. However, Mazurie
did not bring clarity to a most critical issue: resolution of on-reservation state-tribal jursidictional conflicts where both Indians and nonIndians are involved.
Fisher v. District Court' 7" has shed additional light on the meaning of MeClanahan's statement that tribal interests in self-government, i.e., tribal sovereignty, were "backdrop" against which applicable federal statutes and regulations were to be read. In Fisher
the Indian respondents initiated proceedings in a Montana state district court to adopt a minor Indian placed in their temporary
custody by the tribal court. The petitioner, a member of the same
tribe and mother of the minor in temporary custody, moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The state district court
certified to the tribal appellate court the question whether an ordinance of the tribe conferred jurisdiction upon the district court in
this matter. The tribal court indicated it did not, and the district
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The respondents filed in the
Montana supreme court for a writ to set aside the dismissal. The state
supreme court granted relief, holding the district court possessed
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
169. The alternate analogy-that the reach of Indian external sovereign powers is unaffected and permits their exercise absent prohibitive federal law, but that sovereign powers
over internal tribal affairs remain inviolable is not supported with respect to internal sovereign powers by Mazurie's facts or the prior history of Indian litigations. But cf. text accompanying notes 127-129 supra.
170. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
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[s] tate-court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of

self-government conferred upon the ... Tribe and exercised through

the Tribal court. It would subject a dispute arising on the reservation
among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have
established for themselves .... [I] t would create a substantial risk of
conflicting adjudications affecting the custody of the child and
would cause a corresponding decline in the authority of the Tribal

court. (Footnote omitted.)'

7

In reaching its holding, the Court indicated how McClanahan's
"backdrop" analysis was to be applied. Tribal sovereignty (the backdrop) was the starting point for analysis. The pertinent sovereign
powers were to be kept in sight as successive screens of federal and
tribal law were superimposed. After all appropriate federal statutory
and regulatory provisions, and tribal constitutional and statutory
provisions had been overlaid, the unscreened sovereign powers were
what remained to be considered in determining whether tribal selfgovernment interests were being interfered with.' 72
Two 1976 cases also addressed federal preemption and Indian
sovereignty. Moe v. ConfederatedSalish and Kootenai Tribes' 71 was
a consolidation of two actions instituted in federal district court by a
confederated tribe and certain tribal members seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against imposition of Montana's cigarette retailers' licensing requirements and cigarette sales tax on on-reserva171. Id. at 387.
172.
In litigation between Indians and non-Indians arising out of conduct on an
Indian reservation, resolution of conflicts between the jurisdiction of state
and tribal courts has depended, absent a governing act of Congress, on
"whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them." ... Since this litigation involves
only Indians, at least the same standard must be met before the state courts
may exercise jurisdictions.
The right of the ... Tribe to govern itself independently of state law has
been consistently protected by federal statute. As early as 1877, Congress
ratified an agreement between the Tribe and the United States providing that
"Congress shall, by appropriate legislation, secure to [the tribe] an orderly
government; they shall be subject to the laws of the United States, and each
individual shall be protected in his rights of property, person, and life."...
This provision remained unaffected by the act enabling Montana to enter the
Union, and by the other statutes specifically concerned with the ... Tribe.
In 1935, the Tribe adopted a Constitution and By-Laws pursuant to § 16 of
the Indian Reorganization Act ... a statute specifically intended to encourage Indian tribes to revitalize their self-government. . . . Acting pursuant to
the Constitution and By-Laws, the Tribal Council ... established the Tribal
Court and granted it jurisdiction over adoptions "among members of the...
Tribe."
Id. at 368-87 (footnotes and citations omitted). The argument in the text here resonates
with the argument in note 133 supra.
173. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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tion Indian cigarette vendors, and a Montana personal property tax
on the property of tribal members living on the reservation. Preliminarily, the Court held that the vending activities did not involve
activities of a federal instrumentality such as would allow jurisdiction
under one federal statutory provision relied on by the district court,
but jurisdiction had been properly assumed under a separate federal
statutory provision also relied upon by the district court.1 74
Turning to McClanahan's preemption "backdrop" analysis, the
Court observed that the state sought to avoid McClanahan'sresult on
two grounds. The first was by arguing that the reservation in Moe
had developed in a manner different from the reservation in McClanahan, resulting in the tribal Indians in Moe being so completely
integrated with non-Indians that there was no basis for treating the
Indians there differently from non-Indians. 1 7 The second was by
arguing that the General Allotment Act of 18871 76 gave the state
power to tax at least those tribal members living on fee patented
lands. 1 7 1 The first argument was rejected because the Court perceived it to be the same argument made in McClanahan.' 78 The
second argument was rejected because it would result in the impractical pattern of "checkerboard jurisdiction" found untenable in
prior cases. 179
The tribe raised the issue of Indian sovereignty by arguing that
imposition of the cigarette sales tax on sales to non-Indians made the
Indian retailer an "involuntary agent" of the state for collecting
taxes owed by non-Indians, constituting a gross interference with the
tribe's freedom from state regulation.' 80 The tribe relied on Warren
as controlling,' ' 1 but the Court disagreed. Warren involved a special
congressional policy concerning Indian trading posts and a tax
imposed directly on the seller, while here no trading posts were
174. Id. at 471-72. Seealso id. at 474 n.13:
The proper basis for the protection asserted here, of course, is not the
federal-instrumentality doctrine eschewed in Mescalero, but is that which
MeClanahan identified, i.e., that state taxing jurisdiction has been preempted by the applicable treaties and federal legislation.
i7s. Id. at 476.
176. See text accompanying notes 62 & 63 supra.
177. 425 U.S. at 476-77.
178. Id. at 477.
179. Id. at 478 (citing Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975)). The state also argued that tax immunity for the Indians
would constitute invidious discrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. The Court
disagreed, holding that the immunity satisfied the proper test for this issue, i.e., that the
special treatment be rationally tied to "fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward
the Indians." 425 U.S. at 480 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
180. 425 U.S. at 481.
181. Id. at 482.
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involved and the tax presented "a minimal burden designed to avoid
the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the
tribal seller" would avoid payment of "a concededly lawful tax." '1 2
The Court found that Mescalero was not violated because the burden
here was not really a tax, and Williams was not violated because there
was nothing in the burden "which frustrates tribal self-govern1
ment." 83
Bryan v. Itasca County1 84 was an action by a tribal member
seeking a declaratory judgment that Minnesota and one of its counties lacked authority to impose a personal property tax on his mobile
home located on tribal trust land. The state relied on Public Law
280,1 8 a different federal statute than was involved in Moe, for its
authority. Applying a McClanahan preemption analysis, the Court
noted that the act's spare legislative history suggested Congress did
not intend the act's grant of civil jurisdiction to the stale to include
taxing authority.1 86 The Court also found support for this holding
in the recent shift away from assimilation in congressional Indian
policy,' 8 7 and in the fact that such a wholesale extension of state
jurisdiction as would result from the state's reading of Public Law
280 could undermine or destroy tribal governments.' 88
Moe points out that in order to rely on arguments that tribal
sovereignty precludes assertions of state jurisdiction in transactions
between Indians and non-Indians, the tribes will have to carefully
define the tribal interests interfered with. Moe also suggests that
states may be able to use tribal members to enforce state statutory
requirements or policy involving non-Indians if the states are careful
to characterize the statutes or policy as being directed specifically
toward non-Indians. Thus, to this extent, states may be able to exert
on-reservation jurisdiction over Indians without congressional
authorization. Taken in conjunction with Moe, Bryan indicates that
the federal courts will look with disfavor on wholesale assertions of
state jurisdiction, especially where only Indians are affected.
Of all the cases just discussed, Mazurie is singularly important
because it indicates that Indian sovereignty rises above the level of
"backdrop" where it is the tribe which is seeking to actively assert
some sovereign power. Where the state is asserting one of its own
182. Id. at 483.
183. Id.
184. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
185. Id. at 375, 378. See text accompanying notes 10 and 11 supra. Like California,
Minnesota assumed the prescribed jurisdiction under the unamended act.
186. 426 U.S. at 381-86.
187. Id. at 387-88.
188. Id. at 388 & 388 n. 14.
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powers, the other cases indicate that McClanahan's preemption
analysis is the paramount decisional tool. However, taken as a whole,
these cases have done little to facilitate resolution of complex onreservation state-tribal jurisdictional disputes involving both Indians
and non-Indians and both tribal and state assertions of power.
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE TRIBAL POWER TO
CREATE MUNICIPALITIES
Having determined that Indian sovereignty has retained its
vibrancy despite recent congressional and judicial transactions with
that doctrine, it remains to determine whether tribal sovereign
powers encompass the power to create municipalities. The lack of a
definite determination invites litigation of the sort hypothesized in
Situation 1.
The Tribal Power to Chartera Municipality Recognized in the
Cherokee Resolution of March 8, 1813.
The Treaty of February 27, 1819 with the Cherokee Nation' 89
incorporated the Cherokee Resolution of March 8, 1813,' 90 which
provided:
We, the undersigned Chiefs and Councillors of the Cherokees in
full council assembled, do hereby give, grant, and make over unto
Nicholas Byers and David Russell, who are agents in behalf of the
States of Tennessee and Georgia, full power and authority to establish a Turnpike Company, to be composed of them, the said
Nicholas and David, Arthur Henly, John Lowry, Atto. and one other
person, by them to be hereafter named, in behalf of the state of
Georgia; and the above named persons are authorized to nominate
five proper and fit persons, natives of the Cherokees, who, together
with the white men aforesaid, are to constitute the company; which
said company, when thus established, are hereby fully authorized by
us, to lay out and open a road from ... the Tennessee River...
which said road, when opened and established, shall continue and
remain a free and publick highway ... for the full term of twenty
years ... after which time said road, with all its advantages, shall be

surrendered up, and reverted in, the said Cherokee nation. And the
said company ... are hereby authorized, to erect their publick
stands, or houses of entertainment on said road ....

And the said

Turnpike Company do hereby agree to pay the sum of one hundred
and sixty dollars yearly ... for the aforesaid privilege ....
189. 7 Stat. 195.
190. Id. at 198.

The said

Summer 1977]

JURISDICTION ON INDIAN LAND

company are to have the benefit of one ferry on Tennessee river, and
such other ferry or ferries as are necessary on said road ....

9,

This resolution will be construed by showing that of the three types
of business organizations likely to have been designated a "Turnpike
Company"-a partnership, a joint-venture, or a corporate entity-two
do not fit the facts surrounding the resolution, leaving the conclusion
that this was a corporation or proto-corporation.
It must first be remembered that the resolution arose, in part, out
of a background of tribal law and customs. Thus, cautions which
have already been expressed about applying legal analogies drawn
from a federal constitutional, and, inferentially, common law jurisprudential tradition are to be particularly heeded. Nonetheless, the
1813 Cherokee Resolution bears a strong resemblance to the franchises written into many corporation charters of the nineteenth
century.' 9 2 Franchises can be granted to individuals (and individuals
in the guise of partnerships and joint ventures) or corporations,' 9 3
191. Id. at 198-99.
192. Compare the language contained in the Cherokee Resolution of March 8, 1813, as
set out in the text, with the language of the Georgia legislative act which incorporated the
non-Indian parties to the Resolution:
AN ACT To authorise Russell Goodrich, Nicholas Byers, David Russell,
Arthur H. Henley and John Lowry, to open a road... and to incorporate
them into a company by the name of the Unaca, or Unacoi Turnpike company.

§ 1.

§ 2.... said company are vested with full power and authority .. . to
adopt such regulations and concert such measures, as to them shall seem
useful for the institution, not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws
of the state.
§ 3. ... the aforesaid company ... are hereby entitled to occupy and
enjoy all the privileges and advantages arising from said road for the term of
twenty years .. . agreeably with their treaty with the Cherokee Indians....
§ 4. . . . the aforesaid company are hereby authorised to erect a Turnpike
at such place on said road, within the chartered limits of this state, as to
them shall seem most convenient.
§ 5 .... said company shall be entitled to receive the following toll and
rates at said Turnpike,...

§6 ....
§ 7. . . . if any person or persons shall refuse to pay any, or either of the
foregoing rates ... he, she or they so offending, for every such offence, shall
forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding twenty dollars, and ... be liable to an
action or indictment in any court of this state,...

§8 . ..

§ 9. ... nothing contained in this act shall be so construed as to authorise
any person, or persons, to intrude on the lands of the Cherokee Indians,
contrary to the intent and meaning of this act.., or the law of the United
States.
Act of December 13, 1816 Ga. Sess. Laws.
193. See, e.g., California v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., 127 U.S. 1 (1888); People's R.R. v.
Memphis R.R., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 38 (1869).

196
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but can only be granted by a sovereign entity.' 9 The question is
whether the franchise in the 1813 Cherokee Resolution was granted
to individuals as partners or joint venturers, or to a corporation (or
proto corporation) which was to be created by the same instrument.
Partnerships stem from agreements between individuals, resting on
the common law right of those individuals to contract with one
another.' 9 s Thus, if the 1813 Resolution had been directed at individuals or a partnership, it would have been sufficient to grant the
franchise to the named individuals and say no more. Yet the resolution prefaces the granting of the franchise by providing "full power
and authority to establish a Turnpike Company" in which five nonIndians and five Indians are to participate. It does not seem reasonable that such language would have been used to authorize individuals to do that which they could already contract to do among
themselves.' 96
Joint ventures occupy a structural niche somewhere between partnerships and corporations and are of two types: those formed by
common agreement of the members and those formed pursuant to
194. See, e.g., People ex rel. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. State Tax Comm'rs, 174 N.Y.
417, 67 N.E. 69 (1903), aff'd, 199 U.S. 1 (1905) (involving challenge to state power to tax
franchise); State v. Springfield Water Co., 345 Mo. 6, 131 S.W.2d 525, 530 (1939) (corporation's right to make special use of public streets for its equipment must have been specially
conferred by the state in form of franchise). See also 12 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 34.10, at 32 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
195. See, e.g., J. Barrett & E. Seago, Partners and Partnerships: Law and Taxation ch. 1,
§ 3.3, ch. 2, § 2, ch. 4, § § 2-2.3, ch. 8, § 2 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Barrett & Seagol ;
J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership § § 4, 5(b) (1968); R. Sugarman, Sugarman on
Partnership § 2 (4th ed. 1966).
196. Since two of the non-Indians authorized to establish the company were also agents
for the states of Georgia and Tennessee, it may be instructive to examine the case law of
those jurisdictions. Significantly, in two 19th and one 20th century Georgia cases, a strong
tendency to read company to mean corporation appears. See Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood,
14 Ga. 80 (1853) (discussing state statute providing for self-incorporation and use of certain
powers upon incorporation); Wilson & Co. v. Sprague Mowing Mach. Co., 55 Ga. 673 (1876)
(failure of complaint to allege plaintiff was either partner or corporation did not make
complaint defective as use of term "company" implied a corporation); Mattox v. State, 115
Ga. 212, 41 S.E. 709 (1902) (name ending in "company" imports corporation; there is a
difference between such names for corporations and those indicating partnerships or other
natural persons). But see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga. 114, 25 S.E. 249 (1895) (sewing
machine "company" as used in state statute applies to every sewing machine "man").
In Tennessee, the tendency to read company to mean corporation appears in case law
later than in Georgia. Nevertheless, at least one 19th and two 20th century cases indicate
such a trend. See Blue Grass Canning Co. v. Wardman, 103 Tenn. 179, 52 S.W. 137 (1899)
(plaintiff sued "company" as corporation rather than partnership; suit dismissed, but this
error may indicate popular tendency to read company as corporation);Cope v. Wilkinson,
166 Tenn. 63, 59 S.W.2d 528 (1933) ("West Nashville Ready-to-Wear Company" imports a
corporation); Citizens' Bank & Trust Co. v. Scott & Sanders, 18 Tenn. App. 89, 72 S.W.2d
1064 (1933) ("Citizens' Bank & Trust Company" indicates "corporation," not "partnership").
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statutory provisions.' 97 Where the respective interests of the members are represented by transferable shares, the term "joint stock
company" is preferred.' 9 8 On one hand, joint ventures- particularly
contractual joint ventures-so strongly resemble partnerships that
partnership law is deemed generally applicable to them.' 9 9 On the
other hand, statutory joint ventures and corporations strongly resemble each other in that both are creatures of sovereignty.2 0 0 It is
obvious that whatever entity the 1813 Resolution contemplated,
that entity was to be a creation of Indian sovereignty (providing
another reason for ruling out a partnership as the intended form of
business organization). But was a sovereign-created joint venture or
corporate entity contemplated? Among the characteristics which
would rule out a joint venture are
co-ownership of the enterprise; the relation of principal and agent

will not suffice to create a joint adventure; likewise, the creation of a
creditor-debtor relationship does not meet the requirements of a
The latter requires that the parties risk their respective capital as a part of the undertaking. 2 '

joint adventure.

The language of the 1813 Resolution plainly did not anticipate a
principal-agent relationship between the five Indians and five nonIndians. Nor did the resolution appear to contemplate a creditordebtor relationship unless the five Indians were to act as representatives or trustees of the tribal creditor to whom the "Turnpike
Company" owed an annual payment of $160. If the Indians were to
act in such a capacity, a joint venture would be ruled out. Assuming,
however, that the five Indians were to participate as individuals in
the contemplated company, were they also to participate as coowners, or parties risking their respective capital in the company's
operations? The 1813 Resolution does not indicate that those five
Cherokees were to be nominated or appointed to the company based
on their ability to provide investment capital. Thus, if the five
Indians participated in the company as individuals, a joint venture is
again ruled out. The only type of business organization left for consideration is a corporation, or some form of proto-corporate entity.
Significantly, that corporate entity was to have embraced both
Indians and non-Indians. If the power to create a business corpora197. A. Frey, Cases and Materials on Corporations and Partnerships 102 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Frey]. See Barrett & Seago, supra note 195, at ch. 2, § 3.1.
198. See Frey, supra note 197, at 102.
199. E.g., E. Latty & G. Frampton, Basic Business Associations 605-06 (1963).
200. Compare Barrett & Seago, supra note 195, at ch. 2, § § 3, 3.1 and Frey, supra note
197, at 102, with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819).
201. Barrett & Seago, supra note 165, at ch. 2, § 7.
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tion implies the power to create a public or municipal corporation, 2 02 the 1813 Resolution thus indicates that an Indian tribe
may charter a municipal corporation which embraces non-Indians as
citizens or members.
The Tribal Power to Chartera Municipality as an Inherent
Power of Sovereignty
Examination of the general powers of sovereignty also leads to the
conclusion that a tribe has the power to charter a corporate entity.
The principal authority for this proposition is the early case of
McCulloch v. Maryland2 .
where the issue was the authority of
Congress to charter a federal bank. There the Supreme Court stated:
The power of creating a corporation, though appertaining to
sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes,
or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent
power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or
used as a means of executing them. ... No city was ever built, with
the sole object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the best means of being well governed. The power of creating a
corporation is never sued for its own sake, but for the purpose of
effecting something else. No sufficient reason is, therefore, perceived, why it may not pass as incidental to those powers which are
2 04
expressly given, if it be a direct mode of executing them.
It follows from this reasoning in McCulloch that an Indian tribe may
create a corporation to carry out some purpose encompassed by the
tribal powers of internal sovereignty. Thus, if the purposes of tribal
self-government are served by the creation of some private corporate
entity, such an entity may be created; if tribal self-government would
be furthered by chartering a public or municipal corporation, the
corporation can be chartered.
The tribal power to create a corporation received judicial sanction
in Namekagon Development Co., Inc. v. Bois Forte Reservation
Housing Authority. 2 ° s In Namekagon, the plaintiff, a contractor
hired by a tribal housing authority-a corporation chartered by the
tribal local govern'ment-to build housing units on the reservation
sued the federal government, the tribal local government, and the
reservation housing authority for damages for breach of the contract.
The federal district court dismissed in favor of the federal government because the plaintiff's claim exceeded a jurisdictional amount
202.
203.
204.
205.

See text accompanying notes 203-213 infra.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 411.
395 F. Supp. 23 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1975).
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limitation, and in favor of the tribal government because its sovereign
immunity had not been waived. The district court reserved a ruling
on the reservation housing authority's motion for dismissal. In its
opinion, however, the district court noted the denial of that motion,
holding that the housing authority was a corporation separate from
the tribe and not cloaked with the tribe's sovereign immunity because the tribal ordinance creating the corporation had included a
sue-and-be-sued clause not unlike the conventional clause used by the
federal government in similar kinds of contracts. As for the validity
of the incorporation of the housing authority, the district court
wrote:
Did the [tribal local government] , as distinguished from the
Tribe, have power to create a legally responsible corporation? We
think it did. It merely consented to waive the immunity of one

corporation-a corporation fully funded by the federal gbvernment
to build a housing project on a reservation fully controlled by the
[tribal local government]. The scope of the waiver was thus exceedingly narrow and could not obligate any of the Tribal assets. The
Court believes that the power to grant such a limited waiver was
inherent in the [tribal local government's] power to establish a
corporation. 206

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in an opinion written
the following year. Although the appellate court did not directly
address the tribal power to create a corporation, it did discuss the
issue of sovereign immunity which the lower court had seen to be
enmeshed in the incorporation issue:
[T] hough the defendant [housing authority] could, and did, refuse
to relinquish its general immunity from levy and execution, it did

relinquish that immunity as to all funds it received from HUD for
payment of its contractual obligations to Namekagon by Article IX

of their contract. 2 0 7

Other tribes than the one involved in Namekagon have created
entities. Among these are the Navajo Housing Authorcorporate
ity 2 0 and the Standing Rock Sioux Development Corporation. 20 9
The latter entity stimulated a Department of the Interior Solicitor's
Opinion affirming the power of an Indian tribe to charter a corporate
entity distinct from the tribe itself.2 0o
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

395 F. Supp. at 27.
517 F.2d at 510.
6 Navajo Tribal Code § § 351-376 (1969).
Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Ordinance 39.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Solicitor's Opinion M-36781 (1966).
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None of the entities discussed in connection with the 1813 Cherokee Resolution, McCulloch, Namekagon, or the Navajo and Standing
Rock Sioux tribes were municipal corporations. All can be characterized as public or private corporations. Are the power to create a
public or private corporation and the power to create a municipal
corporation correlative as was suggested in discussing McCulloch,
supra? While some authorities trace the roots of municipal corporations to the time of the Roman Empire, 2' 1 it is fairly clear that the
contemporary private-public-municipal corporation trichotomy is of
historically recent vintage, the roots of these entities being merged in
pre-American Revolution English history so that all may be seen as
having partly emerged from the same antecedents. 2 1 2 Thus, at least
in accordance with Anglo-American legal history, there is no reason
to divorce any one of these powers from the others in the absence of
some constitutional or statutory prescription to this effect. Furthermore, there are indications in American Indian history that some
tribes historically possessed autonomous settlements which can be
characterized as municipal corporations or their archetypal pre2
cursors. 13

Conceding that Indian tribes possess the inherent sovereign power
to create or charter a municipality, do they possess jurisdictional
power over non-Indians so as to permit such a municipality to be
211. See Tooke, The Status of the Municipal Corporationin American Law, 16 Minn. L.
Rev. 345-46 (1932).
212. See 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1 (1974).
213. See, e.g., the preamble to the Treaty of July 8, 1817 with the Cherokee Nation, 7
Stat. 156, which begins:
Whereas in the autumn of [1808], a deputation from the Upper and
Lower Cherokee towns, duly authorized by their nation, went on to the city
of Washington, the first named to declare to the President of the United
States their anxious desire to engage in the pursuits of agriculture and the
civilized life ... : The deputies from the lower towns to make known their
desire to continue the hunter life.... (Emphasis added.)
At least one authority concluded the Cherokee towns were municipal corporations. J. Reid,
A Law of Blood 32 (1970). This conclusion receives support from the primitive charter for
Cherokee tribal government adopted May 6, 1817, which begins:
WHEREAS, fifty-four towns and villages have convened in order to deliberate and consider on the situation in our Nation, in the disposition of our
common property of lands, without the unanimous consent of the members
of Council, and in order to obviate the evil consequences resulting in such
course, we have unanimously adopted the following form for the future
government of our Nation.
Laws of the Cherokee Nation: Adopted by the Council at Various Periods 4 (1852). The
charter's language implies that Cherokee towns and villages were imbued with attributes of
sovereignty sufficient to permit them to adopt a form of national constitution. The action
of the convention of Cherokee towns and villages is analogously reminiscent of the delegates
from the colonies to the Second Continental Congress which adopted the Articles of Confederation. See 0. Barck & H Lefler, Colonial America 557-58, 654-55 (2d ed. 1968).
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created for non-Indian residents of tribal lands? Apart from the 1813
Cherokee Resolution there exists authority to support such jurisdiction and power. A case upholding the tribal power to require a
within a reservation
tribal liquor license in order to operate a tavern
2 '4 There is also a series
Mazurie.
v.
is already familiar: United States
or their property
of cases dealing with tribal taxation of non-Indians
2 5 Maxey v. Wright, 2 1 6
1
Madden,
v.
Crabtree
land:
located on Indian
2
Crow v. Oglala
Morris v. Hitchcock,2 '7 Buster v. Wright, 1 8 2Iron
20
2
Tribe.
Sioux
Oglala
v.
Barta
and
19
Sioux Tribe
Crabtree was an action brought by an Indian tribe and its tax
collector in the United States Court for the Indian Territory to collect a tribal tax from a non-Indian doing business on the reservation
as a licensed trader. The trial court dismissed the action and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enforce a tribal tax, and stating in its opinion:
The tax which it is sought to collect by this action was imposed by
the laws of this tribe. If the tribe had lawful authority to impose it,
it had equal power2 to prescribe the remedies and designate the

officers to collect it.

2 1

In Maxey non-Indian attorneys residing on a reservation sought an
injunction in the United States Court for the Indian Tertitory to
prevent the tribe from collecting an annual occupation tax. The
Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory upheld the dismissal of the
action by the trial court, holding the Department of the Interior had
a duty to remove the delinquent taxpayer from the reservation as an
intruder. The tax was found to be valid, but a federal treaty was
2
relied on in reaching this conclusion. 2
Morris involved a tribal tax on animals owned by non-tribal members and located within the reservation. Certain non-Indians whose
cattle and horses were grazing on tribal land under contracts with
individual tribal members brought the action to enjoin the Department of the Interior from seizing or ejecting the animals after the
plaintiffs failed to pay the tax. The Supreme Court held the tax was
a valid exercise of tribal power and did not run afoul of the provision
214. 419 U.S. 544 (1975). See text accompanying notes 165-169 supra.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

54 F. 426 (8th Cir. 1893).
54 S.W. 807 (Ct. App. Indian Terr. 1900), aff'd, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900).
194 U.S. 384 (1904).
135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1965),appealdenied,203 U.S. 599 (1906).
231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
54 F. at 429.

222. 54 S.W. at 808-10.
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of the Commerce Clause allowing Congress to regulate trade with the
Indians. It is unclear to what extent the Court relied on the applicable treaties with the tribe in reaching its holding. As the Court
cryptically said toward the end of its opinion in discussing the effect
of legislation making it the Department of the Interior's duty to eject
cattle pastured on tribal land without a tribal license:
Viewing [that congressional act] in the light of the previous decisions of this court and the dealings between the [tribe] and the
United States, we are of opinion that one of the objects occasioning
the adoption of that act by Congress, having in view the peace and
welfare of [the tribe] , was to permit the continued exercise, by the
legislative body of the tribe, of such a power as is here complained
of, subject to a veto power in the President over such legislation as a
23
preventive of arbitrary and injudicious action. 2
A permit tax imposed by a tribe on non-Indians for the privilege
of trading within its borders was considered by the Eighth Circuit in
Buster. The Buster court made it clear that the power to tax being
considered by it was an inherent power of tribal sovereignty:
The authority of the [tribe] to prescribe the terms upon which
noncitizens may transact business within its borders did not have its
origin in act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the United States.
It was one of the inherent and essential attributes of its original
sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people, indispensable to its
autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an attribute of its government until by the agreement of the nation
itself or
2 24
by the superior power of the republic it is taken from it.
The Buster opinion also contains language pertinent to the issue of
tribal power to charter a municipality for non-Indians. The language,
which appears in a discussion of whether a tribal agreement permit*ting town sites to be laid out within the reservation and lots in them
sold to non-Indians removed the town sites and lots from the reservation, is as follows:
But the jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not
conditioned or limited by the title to the land which they occupy in
it, or by the existence of municipalities therein endowed with power
to collect taxes for city purposes, and to enact and enforce
municipal ordinances. Neither the United States, nor a state, nor any
other sovereign loses the power to govern the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with the
223. 194 U.S. at 393.
224. 135 F. at 950.
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usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy
of the land within its2 territorialjurisdictionby citizens orforeigners.
(Emphasis supplied.) 25
Buster thus provides strong support for the inherent power of an
Indian tribe to create a municipality which can encompass and exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians.
A tribal grazing privilege tax imposed on non-tribal lessees of tribal
land was the subject of separate Eighth Circuit decisions in Iron
Crow and Barta. In Iron Crow the Eighth Circuit upheld the tribe's
power to impose the tax as an inherent power of tribal sovereignty
which had never been taken away by any federal action, but rather,
had been implemented through the tribe's adoption of a constitution
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act which empowered such
taxation.2 26 In Barta the Eighth Circuit upheld the tax in the face of
a contention that it violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments.

2 27

Another set of cases dealing with tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians is of more recent origin and arises in the context of tribal law
2 8
enforcement. The first case is Long v. Quinalt Tribe, 2 a memorandum decision of a federal district court. In Long a non-Indian who
owned property entirely within the boundaries of a reservation was
cited by a tribal officer for trespassing on tribal property. While a
hearing before the tribal court on this charge was pending, the nonIndian brought an action in the federal court seeking relief from the
assertion of tribal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the
action, indicating that the non-Indian had not shown that he lacked a
meaningful remedy in the tribal court, and absent special circumstances, the federal courts should require exhaustion of tribal
2
remedies before considering such matters. 29
A year after Long was decided the Ninth Circuit reached a har2
monious result in Oliphant v. Schlie. 3 The issues in Oliphant
reached the appellate court by a petition for habeas corpus of a
non-Indian awaiting trial before a tribal court on a charge of assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest. The petitioner contended that
the tribal court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to try him on the
charges. The Oliphant court began its inquiry into the issues by
noting that
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 951-52.
231 F.2d at 98-99.
259 F.2d at 556-57.
No. C75-67T (D. Wash. Sep. 2, 1975).
Id. at 2.
544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976).
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[t] he proper approach to the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction
is to ask "first, what the original sovereign powers of the tribes were,
and, then, how far and in what respects these powers have been
limited." 2

31

The Oliphant court then concluded that the jurisdiction sought to be
asserted by the tribe had been such an original power of sovereignty:
Surely the power to preserve order on the reservation, when
necessary by punishing those who violate tribal law, is a sine qua non
of the sovereignty that the [tribe] originally possessed. 2 32

Going on to examine the relevant treaties and federal legislation, the
Oliphant court concluded that neither the treaties nor legislation had
taken away the tribal power to deal with non-Indians who violated
the provisions of the tribal law and order code at issue there. The
denial of the writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.
The Mazurie through Oliphant cases just discussed all sustain the
assertions by various tribal governments of what are traditionally
viewed as exercises of judicial, executive and legislative governmental
power. In each case, the powers sustained had been exercised over
non-Indians. Moreover, the cases all involve matters peculiarly significant in terms of tribal self-government interests: licensing provisions enable tribes to regulate activities important to the tribe's
welfare; taxation provides a fundamental means of nourishing the
machinery of tribal self-government; and exercise of the police power
is necessary if tribal interests are to be protected. Thus, these cases
all support the conclusion already drawn from McCulloch that a tribe
may charter a municipality which encompasses and exercises jurisdiction over non-Indians where this serves tribal self-government
interests. Where the tribe needs the income such a developmental
municipality can provide, and where such a tribally-chartered local
2 3
government can satisfy a host of oher important tribal needs, 3
then there can be no doubt that the tribal power to charter the
municipality exists and can be exercised.
BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: A NEW APPROACH TO INDIAN
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS

The Inadequacy of TraditionalSovereignty Doctrinefor Resolving
JurisdictionalConflicts
Indian sovereignty doctrine has gradually settled on the formula
that tribal powers of internal sovereignty are synonymous with tribal
231. Id. at 1009.
232. Id.
233. See text accompanying notes 35 and 36 supra.
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205

powers of self-government. 2 34 This formulation does not provide
clear guidelines for determining the limits of tribal self-government.
The result is that once the validity of a tribally-chartered municipality is established, there is still no ready means of resolving jurisdictional conflicts of the sort hypothesized in Situation 2, supra. This is
a clear invitation to litigation. Litigation of this sort is certain to
strain the abilities of the courts to sort through and order its complex intricacies. If traditional sovereignty doctrine is relied upon for
this purpose, there will inevitably be a balancing of ill-defined "tribal
self-government" interests against the state, individual non-Indian,
and individual Indian interests which may also be involved. The
long-term result is likely to be emasculation of the tribally-chartered
municipal government for non-Indians.
These limitations indicate a compelling need for new doctrinal
formulation. The beginnings of such a formulation can best be outlined by examining the democratic process of majoritarian government.
Analysis of the Democratic Processand Indian-Created
Municipalitiesfor non-Indians on Indian Land
A. The Democratic Process of Majoritarian Government
The authorities mustered up and examined thus far support the
tribal power to create a municipality for non-Indians. Nevertheless,
there remains a nagging intuition that further inquiry is necessary.
There is, for example, a suspicion that states assert their claims to
authority over reservation residential developments for non-Indians
not only out of fear that reservations may become havens for those
seeking to escape state authority, but also out of a sense that a duty
of some sort is owed to non-Indian reservation development residents. This sense of duty appears to stem from a perception that
non-Indian reservation residents come from a socio-political matrix
differing in many important ways from the socio-political tribal
matrix, thus raising in non-Indians expectation more nearly akin to
those of the off-reservation state citizens-even where the non-Indian
development residents come from out of state-than the expectations
of tribal members. The apprehension that non-Indian expectations
transcend state boundaries leads one to believe that these expectations are more political than social in nature since social lifestyles
vary widely from state to state while political behavior in this country possesses a peculiar sense of commonality or federalism. What
then, is the nature of this common political heritage? It cannot be
234. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
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ascertained merely by examining the constitutional language governing relationships between the state and federal governments and
federal citizens. It is now recognized, for example, that the Constitution's language does not capture the full spectrum of fundamental
rights intrinsic to our democratic system of government. 2 3 Instead,
the focus must be on some more implicit, yet fundamental political
aspect of non-Indian federal
citizenship: the process of democratic
2
majoritarian government. 6
The Supreme Court's opinion are an appropriate starting point for
examining the democratic process familiar to non-Indian. The
Court's views or perceptions, solidified into the verbal formulae of
decisions also inevitably mold the processes they purport to interpret.2 3 7 Close scrutiny of the Court's apposite decisions demonstrates that they flow from carefully disguised a priori reasoning.
Focusing on these decisions' underlying concerns can help expose
this reasoning enough to permit positing a consistent theoretical
explanation of the decisions.
Two cases suitable for beginning the inquiry into the democratic
process of majoritarian government are Eubank v. City of Richmond 2 38 and Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago.2 3 9 Eubank involved a
challenge by a building owner to a municipal ordinance providing
that the city's committee on streets was to establish a building line
for any street upon the petition of the owners of two-thirds of the
frontage on that street. The plaintiff's bay window protruded across
the building line for his street. The ordinance was passed pursuant to
a state statute authorizing municipalities to prescribe and establish
building lines. The Supreme Court held the ordinance was an improper delegation of legislative power:
[The ordinance] leaves no discretion in the committee on streets
235. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance").
236. While these terms are all commonly employed in discussing the nature of the
American political and governmental system, the argument which will be developed here
uses these terms in a sense which owes much to questions raised in F. Michelman & T.
Sandalow, Materials on Government in Urban Areas 117-24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Michelman & Sandalow].
237. See R. Dahl, Who Governs? 316 (1961):
[Dlemocratic beliefs, like other political beliefs, are influenced by a recurring process of interchange among political professionals, the political
stratum, and the great bulk of the population. The process generates enough
agreement on rules and norms so as to permit the system to operate, but
agreement tends to be incomplete, and typically it decays. So the process is
frequently repeated.
238. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
239. 242 U.S. 526 (1916).
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as to whether the street line shall or shall not be established in a
given case. The action of the committee is determined by two-thirds
of the property owners. . . . This we emphasize. One set of owners
determine not only the extent of use but the kind of use which
another set of owners may make of their property. In what way is
the public safety, convenience or welfare served by conferring such
power? The statute and ordinance, while conferring the power on
some property holders to virtually control and dispose of the proper
rights of others, creates no standard by which the power thus given
is to be exercised; .. 24
In Cusack a city ordinance prohibited erection of billboards on
any block-long length of street where one-half of the buildings on
that street were residential in character unless the owners of a
majority of the frontage property gave their consent. The plaintiff,
an outdoor advertising business, maintained that the ordinance involved an improper delegation of legislative power which allowed the
owners of a majority of the frontage property to subject the
minority property owners to restrictions in the use of their property
at the whims of their neighbors. The Supreme Court found no
infirmity in the ordinance:
The plaintiff.., cannot be injured, but ... may be benefited by this
provision, for without it the prohibition of the erection of such
billboards in such residence sections is absolute. He who is not injured by the operation of a law or ordinance cannot be said to be
deprived by it of either constitutional right or of property. 2 4 '
The Court then distinguished Eubank, saying:
A sufficient distinction between the ordinance there considered and
the one at bar is plain. The former left the establishment of the
building line untouched until the lot owners should act and then
made the street committee the mere automatic register of that
action and gave to it the effect of law. The ordinance in the case at
bar absolutely prohibits the erection of any billboards in the blocks
designated, but permits this prohibition to be modified with the
consent of the persons who are to be most affected by such modification. 24 2
Careful examination of Eubank can discern that public safety,
convenience and welfare was not the principle concern of the Court.
What seemed to worry the Court most was the delegation of discretion to set governmental policy, i.e., the statute and ordinance
240. 226 U.S. at 143-44.

241. 242 U.S. at 530.
242. Id. at 531.
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created no standard by which the power to control rights of use by
others was to be exercised. In effect, a decision affecting a local area
was made locally, but was seen as improper because it had not been

filtered through the larger community government.
Two major political process theories can explain the Supreme

Court's result. The first is the general will theory. 2 4

3

For purposes

of analying Eubank, the essence of this theory is that a decision is
improper where not made by a governmental body officially presumed disinterested in the issue being decided, viz., the community
legislators. 2 4 4 The second major theory applicable to Eubank is the
pluralist theory of political process. 2 4 The applicable essence here
is that a legislator is the representative of the particular views of his
constituents. 2 4 6 At first glance, Eubank appears to write the general
will theory into the cannons of political process mandated by the

Constitution. But closer examination of the pluralist theory shows
that it does not have to be rejected to accept the result in Eubank.
For pluralist theory also incorporates the view that the political
243. The term "general will," evidently coined by Rousseau, see J. Rousseau, The Social
Contract (1962), was applied by him to describe the collective community moral and
political values which a community government's policies must generally conform to if that
government is to be considered legitimate. In Rousseau's ideal democracy, the general will
would manifest itself in legislative decisions. Others have since applied the term to characterize their descriptions of the democratic process. E.g., M. Follett, The New State (1918);
J. Pennock, Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects (1950); Hartz, Democracy: Image
and Reality, in Democracy in Mid-Twentieth Century 11-29 (W.Chamber & R. Salisbury
eds. 1960).
244. Compare A. Bentley, The Process of Government 447 (1935):
There is a theory . . . that all acts of government ought to be the product
of clear, cold reasoning, and that the maximum detachment on the part of
the legislator from the interests at stake will get the best results. We may say
that this is "the" theory of political science, as it certainly is the professed
point of view of most criticisms of government and of the theoretical statement of most schemes of reform which do not get into too close contact
with immediate application.
with R. Young, American Law and Politics 421 (1967):
The members of Congress, in other words, are constantly engaged in promoting a harmony of interests in the creation of law and should not be
considered to be merely agents of their constituency.
245. Pluralist theory apparently owes its genesis to the pioneering work of A. F. Bentley.
See A. Bentley, The Process of Government (1935), originally published in 1908.
246. See, e.g., R. Dahl, Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance 163
(2d ed. 1972):
Yet it seems clear that if the principles of political equality and consent
are to have any concrete meaning at all, voters should be able to select
representatives who will reflect their views or values in legislative decisions.
Certainly it would be incompatible with political equality and consent if the
decisions of the legislature did not embody the basic preferences of a majority of the people but instead the conflicting preferences of some minority,
whether that minority be the elected legislators themselves, other officials, or
interest groups.
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process involves log-rolling2 ' 7 -continual shifting of political
alliances and majorities through trade-offs in political support from
issue to issue-so that in the long run, no one comes away from the
political process empty-handed. It is the log-rolling process which
makes majority rule tolerable because it prevents the tyranny of a
static majority. But in Eubank, the group responsible for the decision, i.e., the property owners with frontage on a block-long length
of street, would never again vote as a single political unit on another
issue affecting only that unit. There existed, in effect, a short-term
static majority. While judicial review of the decision made by that
majority was possible, there was no possibility of political review by
voting the decision makers out of office.
Ignoring the Court's superficial beneficence-harm distinction and
concentrating instead on political process analysis, it is difficult to
reconcile Cusack with Eubank in terms of the general will theory. In
terms of pluralist theory, however, reconciliation is possible by
recognizing that this theory really asks whether every interest has
had access to a forum which accommodates the log-rolling process.
No one worries about the ability of the "billboard lobby" to find out
what is going on in the community's legislative chambers and make
its views known there, but where is a "bay window lobby" to be
found?
The Supreme Court's legislative reapportionment cases have
bolstered pluralist theory. Reynolds v. Sims,2 '8 for example, was a
challenge to the constitutionality of the apportionment of the
Alabama legislature. In an opinion holding that that state's legislature
had been unconstitutionally apportioned, the Court appeared to
validate the log-rolling concept:
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are
based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a
rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-population
247.

Log-rolling is a term of opprobrium. This is because it is used mainly with
reference to its grosser forms. But grossness as it is used in this connection
merely means that certain factors which we regard as of great importance are
treated by the legislator as of small importance and traded off by him for
things which we regard as a mess of pottage, but which he regards as the
main business of his activity. Log-rolling is, however, in fact, the most characteristic legislative process.
A. Bentley, The Process of Government 370 (1935).
Once it is recognized that the political process embodies a continuing
stream of separate decisions, the most general model must include the possibility of vote-trading, or, to use the commonly employed American term,
logrolling
J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 132 (1962).

248. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral
state legislature. But neither history alone, nor economic or other
sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to
justify disparities from population-based representation. Citizens,
not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area
alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the
equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or
pastures vote. (Footnotes omitted.)2 4 9

The Court's language implicitly acknowledges that interest group
affiliation may shift from issue to issue and that this must be allowed
to happen to prevent the tyranny of static majorities which results
from stifling the log-rolling process. The Court's opinion expresses a
recognition that in general people, not interest groups, are the basic
voting units. Care must be taken when choosing electoral boundaries
not to choose a boundary which will freeze some interest group into
a majority position. The inevitable result of this reasoning must be
the one-person, one-vote rule first intimated in Baker v. Carr2 0 and
applied in Reynolds v. Sims.2 5
The principles of Reynolds were extended to local governments in
Avery v. Midland County. 2 52 In that case the Supreme Court indicated how deeply it felt the democratic political process was embedded in the dictates of the Constitution and in the fabric of local
government:
That the state legislature may itself be properly apportioned does
not exempt subdivisions from the Fourteenth Amendment. While
state legislatures exercise extensive power over their constituents and
over the various units of local government, the States universally
leave much policy and decision making to their governmental subdivisions.... States characteristically provide for representative
government-for decisionmaking at the local level by representatives
elected by the people. And, not infrequently, the delegation of
power to local units is contained in constitutional provisions for
local home rule which are immune from legislative interference. In a
word, institutions of local government have always been a major
aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation
is today of increasing importance to the quality of life of more and

more of our citizens. We therefore see little difference, in terms of
the application of the Equal Protection Clause and of the principles
249. Id. at 579-80.
250. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Auerbach, The ReapportionmentCases: One Person, One
Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1962).
251. 377 U.S. at 558.
252. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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of Reynolds v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through

legislatures and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns,
and counties. 25 3
In sum, wherever representative local government exists in communities governed by the Constitution, pluralistic democratic processes
must be observed. This is not to say that wherever a local community
exists there must be a representative local government based on these
principles.2 I I The concept of an inherent right of local self-govern-

ment has been argued in the past, and although not conclusively
disposed of, is at least presently not in vogue.2 s 5 It may nevertheless
be meaningful to note that in those instances where no recognized
representative local government exists for non-Indians, there has still
generally been a representative state, territorial or commonwealth
2
government to guarantee a political forum for federal citizens. 1 6
These tendencies all urge the conclusion that even if there is no
mandate that non-Indian federal citizens be provided a governmental
forum which operates in accordance with the principles of the
democratic political process, there is a strong presumption that such
a forum will be provided wherever at all possible.
Non-Indian residents of tribally-created municipalities may owe
political loyalty to two non-federal governmental forums: the local
municipal government established by the tribe and the larger state
government. Since reservation Indians can partake of the benefits of
state citizenship, 2 7 there is no reason for denying dual citizenship
to non-Indian reservation residents. There is also, of course, the
model of dual state and federal citizenship. Upon close examination,
dual citizenship status for non-Indian reservation development resi253. Id. at 481.
254. Cf. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967) (upholding constitutionality of county school board whose members were chosen by local school board delegates where the local school districts represented by single delegates were of disproportionate sizes in terms of electors):
We find no constitutional reason why state or local officers of the nonlegislative character involved here may not be chosen by the governor, by the
legislature, or by some other appointive means rather than by election.
255. See, e.g., Michelman & Sandalow, supra note 236 at 179-85.
256. Examples of exceptions to this observation have generally involved newly-acquired
federal territory. In the areas acquired in the southwestern United States during the Mexican
War, federally-recognized state or territorial governments did not replace military rule for
several years. See, e.g., Perrigo, Our Spanish Southwest 203-13 (1960). Yet even under
military rule some legislative bodies did function. In New Mexico (which under military rule
also encompassed what was later to become the territory of Arizona), for example, a
two-house legislative body elected by the people met once during the August, 1846-March,
1851 military period. T. Donnelly, The Government of New Mexico 2-3 (1953).
257. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Chambers&
Price, supra note 7, at 1089.
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dents may be required by the democratic process theory as nonIndian residents of tribal municipalities would not be entitled to 2full
participation in the tribal, as opposed to municipal, government. 5 8
The consequence of the lack of such participation would be that the
non-Indians might have adequate local interest representation, but
without rights of participation in state government, might find themselves without adequate interest representation with regard to larger
regional or statewide affairs which could have an impact on them. On
the other hand, such interest representation could be found at the
level of federal government. In any event, from the standpoint of
democratic process theory there is nothing inconsistent about nonIndian dual municipal-state citizenship, but such citizenship does
imply a state obligation to its non-Indian on-reservation citizens to
assert its jurisdiction with respect to larger-as opposed to locallyoriented-concerns on the reservation. This would involve nothing
new in Indian law; the test for assertions of state jurisdiction here
would be the Indian self-government analysis which runs through the
Williams-to-Bryan line of cases examined earlier. 2 " The moment the
state seeks to affect a locally-oriented interest where a triballycreated non-Indian municipality is concerned, however, the state has
exceeded the bounds of interest-representation authority and state
jurisdiction cannot be justified.2 6 0
Before turning to means of meeting democratic majoritarian objections to tribally-created municipalities for non-Indians on Indian
land, there is one additional aspect of the democratic process of
majoritarian government which will be briefly examined: judicial
review.
258. Not only are tribal governments not necessarily representative democracies in the
sense that democratic majoritarian government is being used here, but tribal government has
historically been viewed as a process in which only tribal members are entitled to full rights
of participation. Cf. Chambers & Price, supra note 7, at 1088. Non-Indians have occasionally
been given tribal membership status, but such status has ordinarily retained non-Indian
vis-a-vis Indian distinctions, allowing non-Indian tribal members only limited rights of participation in the total sphere of tribal affairs. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76
(1906). It is possible to argue that if non-Indians cannot become full-fledged tribal members, then the municipal polity they are a part of cannot validly be the object of delegated
tribal powers. A response is that while non-Indians did not generally obtain full tribal
membership status, in a few instances they did. Id. at 84. Thus, if a tribe has power to
accord unrestricted tribal membership to non-Indians (barring federal statutory or regulatory restrictions), it should have the power to delegate certain governmental powers to a
tribally-created municipal government for non-Indians possessing a special socio-political
relationship with the tribe.
259. See text accompanying notes 137-188 supra.
260. Tribal interests in self-government are far more likely to be perceived where the
tribe has actively asserted its powers of sovereignty. See C. Goldberg, A Dynamic View of
Tribal Jurisdiction to Tax Non-Indians, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs, 166, 172-73, 186-88
(1976).
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If log-rolling is a critical cog in the machinery of the democratic

process of government, the static majority is a potentially injurious
misalignment of political gears. Since the nature of a static majority
is self-perpetuation, then it is outside the legislative machinery that
one must look for a corrective tool. This is the role the judiciary has
traditionally occupied. As the Supreme Court commented in Baker v.
Carr in addressing the political question doctrine:
The doctrine of which we treat is one of "political questions," not
one of "political cases." The courts cannot reject as "no law suit" a
bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
"political" exceeds constitutional authority.2
61
The requirement of adequate judicial review therefore appears to be

an additional element of the democratic process which must find its

way into consideration of Indian-chartered municipalities for nonIndians. 2 6 2
B. Indian Government and the Democratic Process
There can be no presumption that Indian governmental processes

must be conducted in accordance with the democratic processes of

majoritarian government. 2 6 3 Such democratic principles may be required of Indian governmental processes only where those processes
are regulated by the Constitution itself, or by the statutory imposition of constitutional standards, as with the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968.2 64 And the statutory standards of the Indian Civil Rights
Act are intended to be applied cautiously and only to the extent that
261. 369 U.S. 217. Compare Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in McGautha v. Cali-

fornia, 402 U.S. 183, 270, (1971), rehearingdenied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972), vacated, 408 U.S.
941 (1972) (rejection of challenges to constitutionality of standardless jury sentencing in
imposition of death penalty):
In my view, the cases discussed above establish beyond peradventure the
following propositions. First, due process of law requires the States to protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of state power by assuring that
the fundamental policy choices underlying any exercise of state power are
explicitly articulated by some responsible organ of state government.
Second, due process of law is denied by state procedural mechanisms that
allow for the exercise of arbitrary power without providing any means whereby arbitrary action may be reviewed or corrected. Third, where federally
protected rights are involved due process of law is denied by state procedures
which render inefficacious the federal judicial machinery that has been established for the vindication of those rights.
262. While judicial review is not required by any general tenets of democratic theory, see
R. Dahl, Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance 197-99 (2d ed. 1972),
it has become firmly entrenched in the system of democracy practiced in the United States.
See id. at 188. Judicially speaking, this country's tradition of such review is rooted in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
263. See text accompanying notes 96-110 supra.
264. See text accompanying notes 111-114 supra.
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a particular tribal government may be said to have absorbed non2
Indian democratic principles of government and political process. 6
It is this contrast between non-Indian democratic principles of
majoritarian government, and Indian principles of tribal government
and political process (which presumptively exhibit a wide variation in
their degrees of similarity to non-Indian principles) which appears to
account for the intuitive objections to Indian-created municipalities.
More bluntly, the fear at the root of many objections to allowing
Indian tribal governments to charter non-Indian municipalities is that
Indians will not provide for non-Indian reservation leasehold residents the democratic processes of government which non-Indians
have come to see as being at least constitutionally urged, and perhaps
constitutionally mandated for them. If these objections can be met
there should be no unmoderated need for urging state jurisdiction
and control over such municipalities.
Meeting DemocraticMajoritarianProcess Objections to
Indian-CharteredMunicipalities
A preliminary answer to the political process-based objections to
Indian-created municipalities is for the tribal government to provide
to the non-Indians a traditional, elective, majoritarian system of
municipal government. Yet establishing such a government is not
enough. A difficulty can be discerned in the municipal-tribal relationship: what the tribal government has provided, it may decide to take
away, as in Situation 2, supra. It is this potential for arbitrary exercises of tribal power which makes mere establishment of majoritarian
non-Indian government insufficient to ward off criticism or unease.
A second difficulty can be noted by asking what is to prevent static
majorities or other political irregularities from disrupting the logrolling process in Indian-chartered municipalities? Methods of meeting these difficulties should next be examined.
A. Home Rule in Indian-Chartered Municipalities for Non-Indians
The relationships of tribal governments to their non-Indian
municipalities are not the only varieties of intergovernmental relationships involving municipalities which possess the potential for
arbitrary exercises of power. At times, this potential has attained
reality in the relationships between states and their own municipalities. In the last century fears over the abuse of delegated powers by
state municipalities led to the formulation of the "Dillon Rule"
which specified that municipal corporations could possess and exer265. See text accompanying notes 116-126 supra.
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cise only those powers which were (1) expressly granted, (2) necessarily or fairly implied, or (3) essential to the object and purposes of
the corporation. 2"6 These fears of abuse at the state level also resulted in what has been termed the "local bill" system, 2 6 7 whereby
state legislatures attempted to conduct local affairs from their legislative chambers. The double impact of the judicial application of the
Dillon Rule and the legislative implementation of the local bill
system resulted in the debilitation of municipal corporate government and led to early institution of municipal charters under what
has been termed legislative home rule. 2 68 State constitutional prohibitions on special or local legislation followed, 2 69 and in 1875 the
first state constitutional provision providing authorization for a city
to frame and adopt a charter for its own government 2 71 made its
appearance.
If the Dillon Rule is to be applied to Indian-created municipalities,
the rationale must be some concern analogous to that which provoked the formulation of the rule in the domain of state-municipal
relations in the first instance, e.g., a concern that the non-Indian
municipal governments would become runaway polities which would
interfere with, or ignore, tribal legislative policies. Such a course of
events might be likely in the realm of state-municipal relations where
state legislatures are usually physically remote from the bulk of state
266. See, e.g., State v. Webber, 107 N.C. 962, 12 S.E. 598 (1890) (state statute providing
aldermen may pass ordinances deemed necessary for better city governance did not empower towns to pass ordinances making it offense for owner or occupant of room to allow
prostitution therein). The Webber court stated the Dillon Rule:
In volume 1, § 89, (55,) Dillon says: "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied; third, those essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient, but
indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied."
Id. at 965-66, 12 S.E. at 599.
267. 1 E. Yokley, Municipal Corporations, § 29, at 78-79 (1956).
268. While there is no universal agreement as to the meaning of the term "home rule,"
for purposes of this discussion home rule is assumed to mean a grant of municipal powers
such that the adverse interpretive effects of the Dillon Rule are to some degree overcome.
Cf. Rusco, Municipal Home Rule: Guidelines for Idaho 4 (1960) (the purpose of home rule
is to assure cities some powers independent of state legislative control). Legislative home
rule would thus be the granting of such powers by the legislature. Iowa, perhaps unwittingly, anticipated the crystallization of the Dillon Rule in judicial decision-making and
pioneered legislative home rule with its adoption of a statutory home rule provision in 1851.
See Iowa Code of 1851, ch. 42.
269. E.g., N.M. Const. art. IV, § 24 ("The legislature shall not pass local or special laws
in any of the following cases ..
"). For further discussion of this issue, see Kneier, City
Government in the United States 86 (3rd ed. 1957); Michelman & Sandalow, supra note
236, at 332-39.
270. Mo. Const. art. IX, § 20 (1875).
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municipalities and where the state municipalities are too numerous
to permit continued, detailed knowledge of their activities. But in
the realm of tribal-municipal relations, there will normally be both
geographic proximity and careful monitoring of municipal affairs by
the tribe. If the Dillon Rule were applied to tribally-created municipalities, nevertheless, the result would certainly be a decrease in
municipal autonomy, and perhaps a decrease in the effectiveness of
municipal government similar to that which contributed to the rise
of home rule in the state-municipal realm. The decrease in autonomy
is even more worrisome in the tribal-municipal realm because of the
particular concerns over interference with the majoritarian processes
which are present there. These concerns point in the direction of
home rule as a means of protecting the integrity of the democratic
process of majoritarian government for non-Indian reservation residents. Nor are the autonomy gains restricted only to instances in
which the Dillon Rule is applied. In order to assess any potential
gains in autonomy, however, it is important to distinguish legislative
home rule from constitutional home rule.
Since legislative home rule traditionally requires a charter-a legislative grant of power-from the granting authority, it can also be
withdrawn by subsequent legislative action of the same authority.
Nevertheless, until the charter is retracted, the municipality is free to
act with respect to any local matters not the subject of legislation by
the granting authority, 2 7 1 and it may act free of the Dillon's Rule
presumption that a municipal legislative act is invalid unless it meets
the rule's strict tests for validity. 2 7 2 Furthermore, there is likely to
be more reluctance to withdraw authority delegated to a municipality where that authority comes cloaked in the label "home rule."
These considerations indicate that while legislative home rule may
not provide overwhelming gains in terms of the autonomy of Indiancreated municipalities, 2 71 it may provide measurable improvement.
A difficulty which must also be accounted for in the legislative home
rule situation is that it has occasionally been held unconstitutional as
an unlawful delegation of power. 2 74 However, this circumstance
271. See note 268 supra.
272. See Michelman & Sandalow, supra note 236, at 298-301, 308-313.
273. But see Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 269, 277 (1968):
Cities in the legislative home rule states of New Jersey, Virginia, and Delaware apparently possess more home rule than cities in such constitutional
home rule states as Utah, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Hawaii, and Wisconsin.
(Footnote omitted.)
274. Id. at 275.
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must be weighed cautiously in the light of the unique nature of
Indian law. 2 7 s
The constitutional home rule charter is granted pursuant to procedures prescribed in the applicable provisions in the constitution of
the granting polity. These provisions may be classified as selfexecuting, mandatory, or permissive. 2 7 6 Self-executing provisions
allow municipalities to adopt and immediately exercise home rule
powers without implementing legislation. 2 7 7 Mandatory, or non-selfexecuting, provisions require the legislature of the granting polity to
enact implementing legislation. 2 78 Permissive provisions authorize
home rule, but leave the granting of a home rule charter in the
discretion of the legislature. 79 While the implementation procedures vary, the important observation here is that once constitutional
home rule has been obtained, a constitutional amendment would
ordinarily be required to withdraw a charter-unless the constitution
provided some other means of withdrawal. Since amendments are
more difficult to obtain than legislative enactments, constitutional
home rule is likely to produce a greater gain in terms of autonomy
than legislative home rule with respect to charter withdrawal. Constitutional home rule, like legislative home rule, has the effect of
overcoming the Dillon Rule presumption regarding the invalidity of
local government legislation.2 8 However, it does not follow that
constitutional home rule municipalities have greater freedom to act
with respect to local affairs than legislative home rule municipalities.
This will depend on the powers granted under the constitutional
home rule provision, and any restrictions which have been placed on
their exercise.
Clearly, then, home rule provides definite gains in terms of autonomy for municipalities and can provide worthwhile models for tribes
contemplating the chartering of municipalities for non-Indians on
their reservations. Since not all tribes possess constitutions, for those
which do not the constitutional home rule model could still be
roughly emulated by providing in the municipal charter, for example,
that home rule would only be revoked by a two-thirds or threefourths majority of the chartering legislative body. Other examples,
275. See text accompanying notes 96-126 supra.
276. See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, supra note 273, at
278.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. These distinctions are often difficult to make in actual fact, as home rule
provisions vary greatly among states. See id. at 284-96; Michelman & Sandalow, supra note
236, at 302-04.
280. See note 236 supra.
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equally effective, can readily be conceived; 2 81 the point being that
given the peculiar nature of tribal government, the term "model"
must be loosely employed.
Implementation of some form of home rule would allay some of
the unease over the possibilities of tribal interference with the nonIndians' democratic process of majoritarial government. Closely
followed, the constitutional home rule model would, of course,
provide greater protection against withdrawal of the municipal
charter than the model of legislative home rule. But the legislative
model might result in the granting of a wider range of home rule
powers since the tribe would have to worry less about interference
with tribal interests by the vesting of such powers where it is more
capable of correcting any abuse of those powers on the part of the
municipality.
The home rule models do not completely eliminate tribal influence with respect to municipal governmental activities which affect
larger tribal concerns and culture. Nor is it desirable that such influence be totally eliminated: tribally-created municipalities do, after
all, rest within Indian land, and the non-Indian residents of those
municipalities will generally have recognized at some point prior to
acquiring their leasehold properties, that tribal jurisdiction on the
reservation must be acknowledged and acceeded to in many ways,
just as state jurisdiction must be elsewhere.
In sum, the presence of home rule, or an institution resembling
home rule on the reservation, may provide an important means of
eliminating the need for on-reservation state jurisdiction in order to
secure the democratic process of majoritarian government for nonIndian reservation residents.
B. Judicial Review in Indian-Chartered Municipalities for
Non-Indians
If the purpose of judicial review in the scheme of democratic
majoritarian government is to prevent the disruption of the political
process, where does this review fit in non-Indian reservation municipal government? Certainly a judicial forum is necessary at the
municipal level. A municipal court not only provides a means for
ensuring the enforcement of municipal law, but it also provides a
281. In the case of one tribe, the Pueblo de Cochiti, a charter was granted by the tribe as
part of the contract with the developer. Lease between Pueblo de Cochiti and California
Cities, April 15, 1969, approved by Melvin Nelander, Acting Albuquerque Area Director,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, April 12, 1969, pursuant to delegation of approval authority from
Secretary of Interior dated April 7, 1969. Withdrawal of such a charter could result in
breach of the development contract and consequent loss of revenues and benefits for the
tribe, an incentive for the tribe to temper any contemplated charter withdrawal.
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means of adjudicating and correcting abuses of municipal governmental powers. A municipal court allows this jurisdiction to take
place in a forum sympathetic to and possessing an intuitive under-

standing of non-Indian majoritarian interests.
Yet issues may occasionally arise which also involve larger tribal

interests, or interpretations of tribal law (as with challenges to tribal
delegations of power to the municipality). In these instances it is
important that the tribal judicial establishment have at least the
power to review decisions of the municipal court. 2 8 2 It is possible,

however, that the tribal court or other judicial forum may tend to
lose sight of non-Indian interests during the course of its review
process. Thus, review by a more neutral forum of tribal judicial
decisions involving the interests of non-Indian tribal municipality
residents would seem required in some instances. A judicial authority
which might possess a somewhat more neutral position in such
adjudications than either municipal or tribal judicial forums, and
which might also possess jurisdiction over both the Indian and nonIndian polities involved is the federal judiciary. Indeed, the Indian

Civil Rights Act of 1968 gives the federal district courts subject
matter jurisdiction over many of the categories of issues likely to
require the sort of federal review being discussed here. 2 8 3 Furthermore, the Indian Civil Rights Act has been interpreted to protect the
rights of non-Indians-as well as Indians-on the reservations. 2 8 ' In
cases where the requisite federal jurisdiction has not been granted by
the Indian Civil Rights Act, a case can be made that such jurisdiction
is authorized by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution2 8 s in a
282. Cf Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975) (exhaustion of tribal remedies
may be required of non-Indian litigants before federal jurisdiction will be exercised).
283. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). See notes 108 supra; abstention is not only a minor
difficulty as pointed out there, but it is unlikely to be invoked for an additional reason-the
doctrine is not ordinarily employed where civil rights issues are involved. See G. Gunther &
N. Dowling, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 165 (8th ed. 1970).
284. See, e.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1969) (Indian Civil Rights Act
protects rights of non-Indians, as well as Indians, on the reservation).
285.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority; ... -to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of
different States;-between Citizens of the Same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

220
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manner analogous to that upholding federal jurisdiction over state
286
court proceedings in Cohens v. Virginia.
In summary, federal jurisdiction to review tribal appellate proceedings involving non-Indian municipal court actions seems necessary. Tribal appellate review of non-Indian municipal court pro2
ceedings also appears to be required, 8" but if not provided, federal
2
jurisdiction would seem to lie here also. 8" And a municipal court

for non-Indian reservation communities would be required by the

judicial review principle of democratic majoritarian government. If
these requirements are satisfied, there is less reason to allow state
jurisdiction-at least with respect to non-Indian reservation residents-as a judicial system suitable for protecting non-Indian and
Indian rights will have been provided.
A final point must be raised here in connection with disputes
which might arise between a tribe and a non-Indian municipality
which it has chartered. It is clear that the tribe itself enjoys sovereign
immunity which operates to bar any suit against it in the tribal or
federal courts,2 8 9 unless a tribal statutory or constitutional provi2
sion provides to the contrary, 90 or there exists a waiver of tribal

sovereignty pursuant to a congressional act. Such a federal provision

has been found by implication in the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968.291 Thus, while a tribe itself might refuse to allow suit against

it in either the municipal or tribal courts, such a suit might be possible in federal court where there is an alleged violation of some
provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act which inures to the injury of
the municipality. 2 92
286. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
287. It seems required both from the standpoint of balancing tribal and non-Indian
interests, and by the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies. See notes 108 and 282 supra.
288. On the premise that the municipal court is actually a tribal court possessing delegated tribal powers.
289. See, e.g., United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506
(1940) (reversing rejections of claim by federal government on behalf of Indian tribes but
allowing counter-claim of intervenor against tribes).
290. Suits between municipal and quasi-municipal entities which employ statutory provisions allowing suits against an arm of the state are not uncommon. See, e.g., Michelman &
Sandalow, supra note 236, at 751-76; Comment, Governmental !mmmunity from Local
Zoning Ordinances, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1971). Cf. Namekagon Dev. Co., Inc. v. Bois
Forte Reservation Hous. Auth., 395 F. Supp. 23 (D. Minn. 1974),aff'd, 517 F.2d 508 (8th
Cir. 1975) (permitting suit against tribally-created housing authority where tribe waived the
immunity of the housing authority in the ordinance creating it).
291. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir.
1973).
292. Various tests have been employed to determine whether a state municipality has
standing to bring an action against another state entity. See, e.g., Michelman & Sandalow,
supra note 236, at 751-71. Where the municipality is bringing an action to represent the
individual or private interests of its own citizens, rather than for the protection of its own
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SITUATION ANALYSIS

What resolutions may be achieved in Situations 1, 2 and 3, assuming that something like non-Indian on-reservation municipal home
rule and appropriate municipal-tribal-federal jurisdiction processes
have been provided for?
In Situation 1 there will be no reason for finding that the tribe
cannot create its own municipality for the non-Indian residents of
the leasehold there. Thus, the only reason to void the lease would be
for a failure to comply with some indispensable federal statutory
leasing requirement. 2 9 3 Contentions arising during such actions
concerning the applicability of state zoning, subdivision or similar
laws-laws clearly involving non-Indian statewide interests would
have to be adjudicated by first examining the federal treaties and
statutes for preemption, and if none were found, then determining
whether a tribal interest in self-government were involved.2 94 If such
an interest were involved, the state would be precluded from applying its legislation to the non-Indian municipality. Such a selfgovernment interest could well be involved where the state's assertion of jurisdiction would constitute a serious interference with a
tribe's legal and political relationship with its own non-Indian municipality inasmuch as the municipality can readily be recognized to be
a tribal instrumentality created to facilitate the attainment of important tribal objectives with respect to tribal land.
In Situation 2, the non-Indian community police officer would
clearly have authority to act with respect to the driver who resided in
the non-Indian municipality. With respect to the Indian driver, the
police officer's authority to act would depend on whether the tribal
government had delegated such power to the municipal government.
A far-sighted tribe would retain such authority for itself if it wished
to prevent the application of non-Indian political process (and law
abased on their underlying assumptions) to tribal members. Tribalmunicipal police cooperation would then be essential to maintain
tribal-municipal harmony.
With respect to the non-Indian driver residing off the reservation,
rights and interests, the rule has been established that it cannot do so in the absence of a
statutory provision authorizing it to act for those purposes, or of a contractual right which
it seeks to protect. See, e.g., Parish of Jefferson v. Louisiana Dep't of Corrections, 259 La.
1063, 254 So.2d 582 (1971) (action by parish to enjoin state agency from purchasing
certain property within parish's borders for use as a site for state corrections training
institute).
293. E.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (residential leasehold development involved major federal action requiring environmental impact statement in accordance
with National Environmental Protection Act).
294. See note 260 supra.
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the municipal officer's ability to act will depend on whether the
tribal police could act, and whether that authority to act could be
seen as having been delegated to the municipality. In certain instances tribal authority to act has been recognized in treaty provisions. 2 9 1 The question of municipal police authority to act under
the same provisions will hinge on a determination of whether the
tribe has delegated the appropriate power to the municipality, and
what the exact nature of the tribal power to act was in the first
instance. However, recent cases have indicated that a tribe, and hence
a non-Indian tribal municipality acting under an appropriate delegation of power, can exercise law enforcement jurisdiction over nonIndians provided no federal treaty or legislation has specifically
denied this power to the tribe.2 96 Indeed, because the non-Indian,
non-reservation resident lawbreaker will share democratic process
theory expectations with the members and officials of the nonIndian developmental municipality-expectations shared in very
uncertain measure with tribal members-there should be even less
objection to the exercise of non-Indian municipal law enforcement
powers than tribal powers of law enforcement.
In Situation 3, if the municipal home rule is of the constitutional
variety, the tribe's practical ability to revoke or suspend the municipal charter is reduced. Ultimately, however, that power would exist,
whether municipal or legislative home rule were present. 2 9 7 As for
the contemplated action of the municipality against the tribe, such
an action would have to be raised in federal court as the tribe would
be unlikely to entertain it in a tribal judicial forum. Standing of the
municipality in such federal court actions will turn, in part, on
whether the municipality is suing to protect its own rights, rather
than the rights of its citizens.' 9 8 There seems no basis for concluding that a municipality may enjoy free exercise of religion in a
sense which would allow it to invoke the Indian Civil Rights Act as a
basis for standing. The non-Indian municipal resident who belonged
to the satanic sect, however, would clearly be in a position to make
his way into federal court, since he meets the standing requirement.
The ultimate disposition of this case will depend on an interpretation
of the meaning of religious freedom in the context of tribal con295. See, e.g., Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975) (tribal
police had authority to place non-Indian found on reservation in custody until federal
authorities arrived).
296. See text accompanying notes 228-23 2 supra.
297. There is a substantial deterrent present, however, in the fact that such revocation
would only complicate the tribe's problems and disrupt the developmental scheme upon
which it may depend for revenues.
298. See note 292 supra.
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stitutional or traditional and customary law. 2 9 9 If tribal members
have traditionally enjoyed no freedom to indulge in withcraft, then
the satanic sect member will be subject to a municipal-or in the
event of municipal failure to act-a tribal statute barring such religious practice. He may have no alternative than to terminate his
non-Indian municipal residency and claim damages from the developer (assuming a basis for liability can be found), or the municipality
(assuming the municipality does not enjoy immunity from suit).
CONCLUSIONS
Indian sovereignty as a live doctrine points to the tribal power to
charter a municipality for non-Indians on Indian land. This is not
entirely dispositive as the interests of the non-Indian municipal
residents must also be accounted for and these interests include a
strong, constitutionally-related presumption that where local government is provided to non-Indians, it must comport with the democratic processes of majoritarian government. If such a local government is provided, there is little need for state jurisdiction to be
extended onto the reservation except where larger non-Indian regional or statewide interests are concerned. For such assertions of
state jurisdiction the test-absent preemptive federal law-will be
whether a tribal right related to self-government is being infringed.
Serious interferences with tribal-municipal legal and political relationships would constitute such infringement.
Thus, if safeguards such as those proposed here are present, there
is little reason for prohibiting tribes from creating non-Indian municipalities. Such actions will certainly provide much-needed revenue to
the tribes and may ultimately enhance cross-cultural appreciation
through resulting inter-cultural transactions. If certain rights nonIndians have come to expect-such as religious freedom-differ from
tribal expectations so that some individuals are unable to reside in
non-Indian municipalities because of personal beliefs, the small
number of anticipated instances surely represents a small price to pay
to secure the integrity of Indian cultures which have historically
experienced their own denial of expected rights. Such a disappointment of non-Indian expectations would represent far less of an intrusion into the private lives of non-Indian citizens of this country
than private discrimination conducted through protective covenants,
or the public institutional discrimination which has been a concommitant of contemporary American society.
299. See text accompanying notes 96-127 supra.

